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Preface	
This booklet provides the reader with an extensive summary of the Dutch report on 
climate strategy, published in June 2006, by the Netherlands Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (known as the WRR in Dutch). The WRR is an advisory body, 
which regularly publishes reports. The council seeks to propose a critical, future-
oriented re-appraisal of the assumptions that guide current policy strategies of the 
Dutch government. 
The report on climate strategy was prepared by an internal working group at the WRR. 
The members of the working group were Prof. J.L.M. Pelkmans (Council member), 
P.A. van Driel, Dr. R.M.A. Jansweijer and Dr. D. Scheele (staff officers). In addition, 
W.C. Kersten and Prof. Dr. P. Winsemius were members of the project group in the 
initial phase of the project, while Messrs O. Klinkenberg and C. Veld contributed to the 
project as work in placement trainees. 
External experts were consulted on a number of specific issues in the preperation 
stage. The working group would like to thank the following individuals for sharing 
their knowledge and expertise: Prof.J.C.J.M. van den Bergh (VU), M. Berk (MNP), 
H.C.Y.M. Bersee (VROM), Dr. E. Boeker (WBS), I. Breuers (NWO), J. Brinkhoff (EZ), 
Dr. W. ten Brinke (RIZA), Dr. J.J.C. Bruggink (ECN), Dr. J. Dronkers (RIKZ), Prof. T. 
van der Hagen (RID), B. Hanssen (AER), Prof. E.C. van Ierland (WUR), J.M. Pinkse 
(UVA), Prof. R. Rabbing (WUR), L.G. van Schaik (CEPS), Dr. S. Slingerland (CE), J. 
van der Sommen (NWP), Dr. R. Steur (EZ), J. Veraart (WUR), prof. J.M. Verschuren, 
A.M. Versteegh (NRG), L. Voogt (RIKZ), M.F.M. van Wortel (V&W) and R. Ybema 
(ECN). 
Although the working group made grateful use of the knowledge of these experts, this 
report falls under the responsibility of the Council. 
The WRR is very grateful to Julian Ross, who helped with the editorial and translation 
work needed to create the right context fot htis English language compilation. 
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There are strong indications that the climate is changing, partly under the influence of 
human activity. A substantial reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases is required 
in order to slow down the rate of climate change sufficiently. However, while the total 
global volume of CO2 emissions needs to fall sharply, they are expected to increase 
steeply as a result of rising prosperity and population growth. There are considerable 
uncertainties and all manner of complicating factors which make it difficult to formu-
late an effective climate strategy. The magnitude of the climate effects (and sometimes 
the direction in which they operate) is difficult to predict. There are large gaps in 
our knowledge about the climate system, partly due to the extreme slowness of that 
system. This raises the danger of setting in motion irreversible changes. The problem 
of policy formulation is also exacerbated by the global setting in which it has to be 
achieved. Different countries have widely diverging interests and consistently place 
the emphasis on economic growth, leading to an increase rather than a decrease in 
greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, international coordination of emission reduction 
efforts is problematic, which could well lead to inadequate policy. These uncertainties 
and complicating factors could engender high costs. Given these uncertainties, climate 
policy ought to strive not only for optimisation, but also robustness. A robust strategy 
is aimed at effectiveness in a wide variety of potential scenarios. 
Difficult judgments 
There are wide differences in the way individual countries view the climate issue. The 
global divergence in perceptions, interests and preferences can make it difficult to 
formulate an effective climate strategy. The effectiveness of that strategy depends on 
the goals that countries pursue, and reaching agreement on them (in the sense of hard 
commitment) will not be easy. Differences in perceptions and preferences can lead 
to unbridgeable differences in the degree of willingness to bear the costs. One of the 
problems when deciding on the cost distribution is that both the costs of adaptation 
and of reducing the rate of climate change are unclear. Moreover, policymakers have 
to weigh those costs against completely different objectives which also require govern-
ment intervention (economic growth, education, health care, infrastructure, pensi-
ons, military spending, and so on); the emphasis given to these objectives also varies 
considerably from one country to another.  Applying the precautionary principle does 
not offer an immediate solution, because high costs have to be weighed against risks 
which are to some extent still unknown. This raises the paradox of trying to estimate 
the unknown. The precautionary principle can therefore not provide an answer to the 
question of what constitutes a sensible mix of emission reductions and adaptation. 
The lack of an optimum policy mix also implies that the principle of intergenerational 




No effective policy to date 
The European Union (eU) decided in 1996 that the increase in global temperatures 
as a consequence of climate change had to be limited in the present century to 2 °C 
relative to pre-industrial levels. This position was reaffirmed in 2005, when it was 
also stipulated that the attainability of the reduction targets should be reviewed in the 
light of costs/benefits aspects. The	EU	has a well-developed emissions trading system, 
putting it at the head of the field. At the same time, the	EU	pursues a specific climate 
policy on various fronts. The Netherlands has played a pioneering role in this climate 
policy. At global level, under the Kyoto protocol the signatory countries agreed to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in the period 2008-2012 to at least 5% below 
the level in 1990. The policy pursued thus far has not proved effective, either in the	EU	
or globally. On the contrary, policy activism in the	EU	has led to fragmentation, and in 
the Netherlands to a plethora of changes of direction. The potential for cost-effective 
domestic climate policy appears to be limited, and much of the effort will therefore 
have to be directed towards achieving objectives outside the Netherlands (and even 
outside Europe). Globally, the targets set by the Kyoto protocol are too limited, cover 
a very short period and apply only for a select group of developed countries which 
already have relatively CO2-efficient economies. The policy to date – both globally and 
at the level of the	eU	and the Netherlands – lacks a global, long-term perspective. 
A new climate strategy 
This WRR report sets out a climate strategy which provides both a rationale and direc-
tion to the Dutch policy within the EU and to the	EU	policy in a global context. The 
Council took the following question as its starting point: 
How can the Netherlands, as a member of the European Union, pursue an effective 
climate policy from a global and strategic perspective? 
Key notions which characterise this strategy are: a global and long-term approach as 
inalienable principles; effectiveness of emission reduction by 2050; cost minimisation 
in the choice between options available now and the choice between options over a 
period of decades; damage limitation through timely adaptation to a climate which is 
undeniably changing; unflagging and energetic promotion of low-emission technology 
and innovation; a strategic approach to global coordination; and finally robustness, in 
view of the major uncertainties. The proposed climate strategy is based on three policy 
tracks: (1) adaptation to climate change; (2) reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; 
and (3) effective global coordination. 
(1) High priority for adaptation 
Adapting to a changing climate can reduce or prevent later damage. While adaptation 
policy cannot and must not replace internationally coordinated reductions in green-
house gas emissions, for many countries – and in any event for the Netherlands – it is 
considerably easier to achieve. It is not an acceptance of defeat, but is in fact an attrac-
tive option because the fruits of local efforts are also enjoyed locally, something which 
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applies to only a very limited extent for emission reductions. Adaptation is not always 
possible globally, or can be so costly and disruptive that ultimately total emigration 
becomes unavoidable in certain localities. Adaptation can therefore not be viewed at 
the purely local level in all cases. The world community can reinforce or supplement 
the adaptive capacity of poor countries, and will sooner or later have to address vulne-
rabilities that can threaten the existence or cohesion of entire regions or peoples. 
For the Netherlands, the most relevant climate changes from a policy perspective are 
the prospect of a wetter climate and higher sea levels (+20 cm to +110 cm by 2100). In 
the first place, therefore, adaptation will be focused on water policy in relation to flood 
protection; this is of great importance for four reasons: 
•  Climate change will still occur if emission reductions are successful, albeit in milder 
form. 
•  The credibility of coordinated global emission reductions is (so far) low. 
•  Successful adaptation will improve the Netherlands’ international negotiating  
position. 
•  Catching up in the area of cost-effective flood protection. 
In addition to attention for flood protection, consideration also needs to be given to 
natural assets and ecology. Climate change not only brings threats to the natural land-
scape, but also opportunities, and to some extent these opportunities can be created in 
the wake of the measures taken. Synergy can often be found between flood protection 
and housing construction or natural recovery. This synergy can be exploited to broa-
den the support for adaptive measures. The main concern in Dutch adaptation policy 
is to keep options open. Flood protection measures demand major investments and 
are long-term in nature. A phased approach could be chosen for these investments; 
however, the same cannot be said for the creation of space for storing any surplus 
river water, when it is not certain whether these reserves will ever be used. There are 
three further problems: first, developed areas cannot be de-urbanised, or at least only 
at extremely high cost; second, there is insufficient administrative impetus to push 
through the reservation of space; and thirdly, public support for measures to protect 
against the flood risk is low. Flood protection is a national interest which needs to 
be fitted into the local context by seeking optimum solutions, not by watering down 
the national objectives. In some localities water will need to be given priority over 
construction, and vice versa. A higher priority for water management requires the 
adoption of a stronger position by national government, overriding the position of 
lower administrative echelons. The importance of the flood protection offered by the 
primary flood barriers will benefit from a greater awareness of the flood risk. 
(2) Reduction of emissions: routes and timeframes 
In order to achieve the EU’s 2°C target, a considerable reduction in global greenhouse 
gas emissions will have to be accomplished in the coming decades, of the order of 10-
11 gigatonnes of carbon (GtC) per year in 2050 compared with a ‘business as usual’ 




transition in the energy system; for the moment existing, mature technologies must 
be used. Modern renewable energy sources (solar, wind, hydropower and modern 
biomass) offer too little potential to realise a globally adequate reduction in green-
house gas emissions in the period up to 2030, quite apart from the question of relative 
costs. Hence, fossil fuels will continue to dominate the world energy supply until at 
least 2050. Coal in particular will continue to play an important role. A dozen coal-
based economies, which together account for roughly two-thirds of the world popu-
lation, will undoubtedly exploit the existing cheap and well-distributed coal reserves. 
Thus, a global climate strategy will inevitably have to focus its emission reduction 
efforts on coal (‘clean fossil energy’). 
•  Energy efficiency (3.4 GtC per year). This option saves fuel (often referred to as 
a ‘no regret’ option) and is therefore attractive, but this does not mean it comes 
without cost. The emphasis will have to be placed on electricity consumption, elec-
tricity generation and heating. The greatest savings are to be made in the emerging 
economies. 
•  Energy mix (4 GtC per year). This route entails CO2 sequestration and storage in 
combination with gasification technology and the use of biomass. The transport 
sector could make a significant contribution to this in the longer term, among other 
things by using biofuels. 
•  Photosynthesis (2 GtC per year). This route entails the curbing of deforestation, 
an acceleration in afforestation and reforestation, better utilisation of timber in 
products and buildings, and more sustainable agriculture. The potential of this 
option is of limited duration. 
 •  Reduction of other greenhouse gases (1 GtC per year), primarily methane and 
(industrial) N2o. 
In addition to these main routes, there are additional options for reducing emissions, 
by means of nuclear energy and wind energy. 
The emission reduction routes use mature technology, but are not enough to achieve 
the further emission reductions that will still be needed after 2050. By that time, the 
energy supply will have to undergo a transition to emission-free energy. This can only 
be realized if the wealthy nations invest in large-scale and long-term research and 
development. The Council recommends the establishment of a Top Technology Insti-
tute on emission-free energy for the development of this knowledge. Precisely because 
of the discrepancy between the existing and desired technology, a clear distinction 
needs to be made between technology development and technology diffusion. In the 
present policy of the	EU	and the Netherlands this distinction is not adequately made, 
and this in turn pushes up costs. 
(3) Effective global coordination 
The greatest task in the coming decades is to ensure that industrialising and poor 
countries realise their economic growth in an emission-efficient way. The marginal 
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costs of emission reduction will remain low in these developing countries for several 
decades to come, but the reduction in CO2 emissions will only be achieved if the 
wealthy OECD countries meet all or part of the costs. The Council therefore is of the 
view that the Netherlands needs to focus its emission reduction efforts as a priority on 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), if necessary in combination with develop-
ment policy. The emissions trading system set out under the Kyoto protocol is a valu-
able instrument for the leading countries, but suffers from the effectiveness paradox: 
what is achievable is not effective, what is effective is not achievable. The small group 
of participating countries cannot develop an effective global policy without the coun-
tries which do not or are not willing to participate in Kyoto in the foreseeable future. 
Often, the reluctance of non-participating countries is based on fears of reduced 
economic growth and a desire to secure energy supplies. This means that, in addition 
to the Kyoto approach, a ‘multicoloured flexibility’ is needed in the array of initiatives 
designed to meet the interests of these countries. This will make it easier to generate 
support for the development of technologies which facilitate the climate-friendly 
exploitation of coal than for the setting of emission ceilings which could put a brake on 
the economic growth of emerging economies. When it comes to energy efficiency, the 
interests of the climate and of a secure energy supply are parallel, making energy effi-
ciency a promising policy. Common interests form the starting point for the establish-
ment of coalitions which will tackle whole or partial problems jointly. These coalitions 
could focus on different domains, and could for example consist of coalitions of coun-
tries (e.g. heavy polluters which together can have a decisive influence on emissions), 
as well as corporate coalitions (e.g. companies which agree a joint sectoral standard 
for energy efficiency in the market, which can be tightened up further as time progres-
ses).The required ‘multicoloured flexibility’ can take on divergent various forms, vary-
ing from a ‘no-regret’ policy (with enormous potential in developing countries), a ‘no-
lose’ policy (which provides incentives to reduce emissions but imposes no sanctions 
if they are exceeded), technology development and diffusion and intensity targets, to 
self-imposed climate policy involving accountability and an emissions trading system 
or carbon price. As with the trade policy, it is both possible and attractive in some 
areas to stimulate emission reductions bilaterally and regionally, for example as part 
of existing special relations or development policy. In addition industry, knowledge 
institutions and	NGOS need to be actively involved in climate policy. Interesting deve-
lopments are going on at this more horizontal transnational level which should be 
encouraged where possible. 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) offers a 
suitable framework for multilateral coordination, but in order to make the coordi-
nation more effective, a World Climate Organisation (WCO) needs to be set up, as a 
permanent organisation backed by permanent diplomatic missions. This is neces-
sary in order to create a degree of problem-ownership, so that decisions are taken 




Council) for permanent and rotating national members, with a gradual increase in its 
powers. The WCO could then in time take over the leadership from the de EU, which 
also implies that the	EU	and Japan would then no longer be setting (or be able to set) 
the agenda. Until then, leadership by the	EU	is both desirable and necessary in order 
for it to play a catalytic role.
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1	IntroductIon	
This document is an abridged version of the Dutch-language report on climate policy 
Klimaatbeleid – tussen ambitie en realisme (‘Climate policy - between ambition and 
realism’) published by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy 
(WRR 2006). As well as being longer, the original report also contains 12 appendices 
each focusing in more detail on a specific topic.
1.1	 the	clImate	Problem	
The Earth’s climate will become warmer in the coming centuries, and the consequen-
ces of this will vary widely at local level. This global climate change is due at least in 
part to human activity. The sustainability of the Earth in the long term depends on a 
stable atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases. In order to achieve that stable 
situation, emissions will have to be brought far below their current levels. The desira-
bility of achieving this reduction forms the starting point for climate policy. 
In the longer term, the climate problem is related principally to emissions of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) as a consequence of energy consumption, though the impact of other 
greenhouse gases such as methane will certainly not be negligible in the shorter term. 
According to the International Energy Agency, CO2 emissions per head of the global 
population amounted to 3.9 tonnes per year in 2001. However, there are considerable 
differences at national level: per capita emissions in the developed countries average 
11 tonnes per year, and in the United States (US) the figure is no less than 19 tonnes. 
At present, the emissions in poor nations amount to less than 1 tonne per year per 
head of the population. 
The greenhouse effect is associated with wealth and prosperity in two ways. On the 
one hand increasing prosperity leads to greater consumption of energy and thus to 
a bigger greenhouse effect. On the other hand, prosperity creates a better balance 
between gross domestic product (GDP) and energy consumption; in other words, to 
the extent that CO2 is regarded as pollution, richer countries produce more cleanly 
than poor countries. The first effect dominates at present. In the near future, the way 
in which the problem develops will be determined mainly by emerging economies such 
as India and China. 
1.2	 clImate	PolIcy
Climate policy has been pursued since the early 1990s. It is based on the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and, as regards the CO2 emis-




which the signatory countries agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in 
the period 2008-2012 to an average of 5 percent below their level in 1990. Although 
the body of knowledge is increasing, there are still many uncertainties regarding the 
nature of the climate problem. The accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosp-
here over many decades could however ultimately have such a destabilising impact 
that a ‘no policy’ option must be regarded as reckless. The consequences vary widely 
for different countries. 
The policy pursued thus far has not been effective. The objectives in the Kyoto Proto-
col are focused on the ultra-short term in climatic terms, are not very ambitious in 
their substance and have no mandatory force in the post-Kyoto period after 2012. The 
Kyoto model cannot provide the ultimate solution because efficacy and feasibility are 
mutually exclusive. The Kyoto instruments serve a useful purpose as precursors, but 
suffer from a lack of global support needed for their far-reaching implementation. 
A strategic climate policy must be based on a long-term approach which is robust 
enough to deal with the uncertainties that surround the climate problem. A ‘robust’ 
approach means a strategy which delivers good results for the climate in a range of 
future scenarios based on different assumptions. 
1.3	 QuestIons	addressed	In	the	rePort
This report seeks to answer the question of how the Netherlands, as a member state 
of the European Union, can pursue an effective climate policy based on a global and 
strategic perspective. Without this global perspective, every climate policy is doomed 
to failure. Achieving an effective climate policy is difficult, given the long time hori-
zon involved and the extreme complexity of the policy setting. The following aspects 
contribute to this complexity: (a) the great uncertainties in our knowledge of the 
climate system; (b) the extreme slowness of the climate system; (c) the global setting; 
(d) the emphasis on economic growth, especially in the poorer countries, as a result of 
which emissions are more likely to rise than fall; (e) the highly diverging interests of 
the different countries; and (f) the difficulty or even impossibility of securing world-
wide coordination due to weak or perverse incentives. 
From a policy perspective, the climate problem can be divided into three main compo-
nents, or constituent problems, each of which contributes to the solution of the overall 
problem:
(1) Adaptation. The climate is changing, and it will continue to do so even if emissions 
are successfully reduced. Emission reduction will slow down the rate of change 
and reduce the ultimate temperature increase, but will not prevent climate change. 
Climate policy will therefore have to comprise a mix of adaptation to change and 
emission reduction. 
1
(2) Emission reduction routes. Increasing prosperity means growing energy consump-
tion and, as things stand at present, this means a rise in CO2 emissions. This 
growth will take place mainly outside the oeCd countries. Diffusion of available 
technology to emerging economies could enable these countries to bypass the 
historical, energy-intensive path taken by the West in favour of an economic 
growth path based on much higher energy efficiency. Emission reduction techno-
logies will therefore need to be suitable for application in emerging economies if 
a global emission reduction policy is to have any chance of succeeding. But fairly 
radical innovation will also be needed, because it is apparent that in the longer 
term transitions to new forms of energy and production will be needed and that 
there are as yet no silver bullets which can solve the problem at a stroke. 
(3) Coordination and negotiation. Markets are not capable of internalising the exter-
nal effects of emissions adequately. There is thus a need for coordinated policy. 
This coordination issue can be broken down into three constituent issues: 
• Development: roughly three-quarters of the world population live in poor or indu-
strialising nations, which is where most of the economic growth will take place. 
• Distribution: countries will have to negotiate a system of cost-sharing which is 
acceptable for all parties. 
• Allocation: the required innovation and diffusion will have to be achieved as effi-
ciently as possible. 
The Council is interested not only in the effectiveness of climate policy, but also its 
efficiency. Effectiveness is concerned chiefly with the question of whether the set goals 
can be achieved; efficiency is on achieving those goals at the lowest possible cost. Lack 
of efficiency means that ‘things are not being done in the best way’, something that can 
be resolved by choosing cheaper available solutions. Lack of effectiveness highlights a 
discrepancy between the goal and the available resources: the ambitions have been set 
too high and need to be adjusted and/or the resources made available are inadequate 
and need to be increased. Lack of effectiveness can thus also lead to the social ques-
tion of whether ‘the best things are being done’: a reappraisal of preferences in which 
climate is just one element. Reflection on this second question is crucial for a strategy, 
but is much more difficult than the more technocratic first question. 
Adequately tempering climate change is an enormous ambition when translated into 
actual emission reductions. Ambition needs to go hand-in-hand with realism. Taking the 
interests of the various players as a basis, and taking those diverse interests seriously, 
increases the chance of pursuing an effective policy in the imperfect world of internatio-
nal relations. The Council favours a pragmatic approach, since this offers the greatest 
chance of success. This means that, as far as possible, a moral perspective is avoided. 
This report is a policy report. The climate as a physical problem is an object of study for 




form on which that knowledge is made available; the WRR has nothing to add in that area. 
1.4	 structure	of	the	rePort
Chapter 2 presents essential background knowledge. It discusses the choices that have 
to be made when formulating climate policy against the backdrop of the prevailing 
uncertainties. The chapter also summarises the present climate policy of the Nether-
lands and the European Union (EU). 
The remaining chapters of the report explore three policy tracks: (1) adaptation to 
climate change; (2) emission reductions as a means of tempering climate change; and 
(3) international coordination to achieve those emission reductions.
Chapter 3 discusses adaptation to a changing climate. From the perspective of adap-
tation, global climate change is above all a regional problem: although the effects 
occur everywhere, they are felt at local level and differ from one locality to the next; 
moreover, the costs of adaptation are borne locally. The approach to adaptation taken 
in the report is chiefly regional, since the focus of the study is limited to the Dutch 
(European) position. But adaptation is also a global issue, because the poor nations 
have insufficient capacity to pursue an effective policy (in time) and supporting them 
is therefore justified. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the global strategic pathways for achieving emission reductions. 
The perspective adopted here is primarily global, since it obviously makes no differ-
ence for the climate where emissions (and their reduction) take place. This chapter 
explores the magnitude of the global challenge that has to be met, looks at the main 
emission reduction routes and examines which options can be applied most cost-effec-
tively in which regions. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with international coordination. The approach here is again 
primarily global. The key at global level is to apply the technologies discussed in chap-
ter 4 effectively given the backdrop of the interplay of interests and preferences. Coali-
tion formation and leadership are the central issues here. Suggestions are made for 
a partial institutionalisation of global coordination in order to lower the transaction 
costs and promote a favourable outcome for approaches based on problem-ownership.
The report concludes with chapter 6, which links the global approach described in the 
chapters on emission reduction routes and coordination to Dutch policy. The conclu-
sion is that Dutch policy will be most effective if it is focused on an intelligent combina-
tion of Dutch adaptation and effective global emission reduction and coordination. For 
a small country like the Netherlands, the key is to combine realpolitik with an ambi-
tious and creative approach. 
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2	Problem	defInItIon	and	PolIcy	
Section 2.1 describes the present state of knowledge about the climate. Section 2.2 discus-
ses the difficult judgments that have to be made in formulating climate policy. Section 2.3 
shows that the climate policy pursued to date can at best be seen as a first step. 
2.1	 Knowledge	about	the	clImate
Our knowledge about the climate and the influence of human activity on it is still 
incomplete, but is increasing. This report takes as its starting point the scientific 
insights as set out in the Third Assessment Report (TAR) by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001), supplemented by more recent insights both 
at global level (Levin and Persching 2006) and specifically for the Netherlands (MNP 
2005; Rooijers et al. 2004). The current level of knowledge suggests that, without a 
climate policy, the global temperature will rise in the period to 2100 by an average 
of between 1.4 °C and 5.8 °C compared with 1990. The average world temperature in 
1990 was already 0.6 °C higher than in 1850.
The global climate system reacts only very slowly to changes in emission patterns. 
There is a time lag in the reaction of CO2 concentrations to changes in emission 
patterns because of the long residence times of greenhouse gases (GHGS) in the 
atmosphere and because emissions resulting from human activity are small in rela-
tion to the total amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. Moreover, the global tempera-
ture responds slowly to changes in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases 
because the change in the energy balance is small in relation to the accumulated 
warmth. There is thus a double delay in the transition from a ‘flow variable’ to a ‘stock 
variable’, in which the second flow is determined by the initial stock of greenhouse 
gases. In such a slow system, disturbances have a lasting effect and the end result of 
changes in emission patterns are seen only after many centuries. Even in the event of 
a reduction in net emissions, the temperature rise that has begun will continue for a 
long time. Although the year 2100 is often used as an endpoint for projections, a stable 
final situation will not have been reached by that year, especially as regards sea levels.
There are two main causes of the margin of uncertainty in projecting the rise in aver-
age temperatures. First, there is uncertainty regarding the global increase in green-
house gas emissions. Energy consumption and the extent to which this is based on 
fossil fuels plays a key role here, but as well as CO2 there are many other ghgs, of 
which methane is the most important in volume terms. Energy consumption is largely 
dictated by the rate of economic growth, especially in developing economies. The IPCC 
has developed a number of projections which have been translated by scientists into 
emissions scenarios (see the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES)). 
problem definition and policy
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The second reason for the margin of error is the uncertainty surrounding the many 
feedback effects, known as climate sensitivity. As a result, the precise influence of an 
additional tonne of CO2 in the atmosphere is uncertain. The picture is generally domi-
nated by negative feedback, for the simple reason that systems by their nature tend 
away from instability. However, the climate is a complex and dynamic system with a 
host of different quasi-stable states; it could be compared with a canoe, which is in a 
quasi-stable state both when upright and when capsized. Human influence can push 
the system towards an alternative stable state, in which the system can then remain for 
a long time (Alley 2004). It is virtually impossible to predict where the threshold lies 
that leads to a new stable state, and therefore to forecast whether and when a point of 
no return will be reached. There are several ‘sleeping giants’ at play here: processes 
which, once they have begun, could be difficult or impossible to control (New Scien-
tist, 12 February 2005: 9-11).
The climate problem is at once too large and too small. It is too large in the sense that 
the consequences in the long term are very considerable and the ability to control 
those consequences is limited. It is questionable whether, given the present status of 
technology and international coordination, the climate problem can be resolved at all 
(in other words, whether the 2°C target set by the European Union (EU) is realistic). 
At the same time, the climate problem is too small in the sense that in the period up to 
2050 no genuinely threatening harmful effects are likely to occur. Engendering a sense 
of urgency generally requires a dramatic event in the short term. The changing climate 
may make the prospect of such events likely in the long term, but by then it will be 
much too late to do anything about them. This opposition creates a predicament for 
those trying to draw the climate problem to the world’s attention. In order to prevent 
policy efforts becoming paralysed, the actions needed in order to resolve the problem 
are sometimes portrayed as smaller than they are in reality. The other side of the 
predicament is that, in order to increase people’s perception of the problem, tactical 
and strategic research results are aired which show that climate change is already clea-
rly observable and can/will lead to all manner of apocalyptic scenarios – in which the 




From a purely economic point of view, the ideal would be an optimum mix between 
adaptation policy and emission reduction policy. This optimum mix could be found by 
equalising the marginal costs of emission reduction and adaptation (both in a broad 
sense). However, this is possible only in theory; practical reality is a different matter. 
In the climate debate the urgency of the need for emission reduction policy is argued 
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on the basis of adaptation costs and uncertainty. This can create the false impression 
that, rather than following an analytical, logical path that results in an estimation of 
effects based on the actions to be undertaken, the opposite path is in fact being follo-
wed, which starts from a preference for certain actions and leads to a justification of 
that preference through an estimation of the effects. The weighing up of the costs of 
adaptation and emission reduction is thus be hedged in with a number of taboos in 
practice. Here, the discussion is focused on whether it is possible to formulate an opti-
mum global climate policy. The discussion is abstracted from regional differences in 
costs of adaptation and emission reduction, and from the question of whether an opti-
mum global climate policy could actually be implemented via negotiation. 
Many studies suggest that adaptation policy is a necessary complement to an emission 
reduction policy, because climate change cannot be avoided entirely, but that adap-
tation policy cannot replace emission reduction policy (IPCC 2001; Easterling et al. 
2004; VROM-raad and AER 2004). The implicit priority this gives to emission reduc-
tion policy over adaptation policy is something that demands critical reflection. 
When seeking an optimum mix between adaptation policy and emission reduction 
policy, a distinction has to be made between cost-effectiveness on the one hand and a 
cost-benefit analysis on the other. In analyses relating to cost-effectiveness the goal is 
fixed (in this case a temperature increase of less than 2 °C) and this goal is achieved 
with the deployment of the fewest resources possible. Typically, the goal is measu-
red using different criteria from the resources. In a cost-benefit analysis, the goal is 
derived from the costs to be incurred and the anticipated benefits. The marginal bene-
fits of emission reduction policy (= emission reduction benefits) consist in the avoided 
damage due to climate change and consequently the saved adaptation costs, possibly 
reduced by the unrealised benefits of climate change. For the first tonne of CO2 equi-
valents, the emission reduction costs are low and the emission reduction benefits 
are high; for the last tonne the reverse applies. The optimum goal is reached when 
the marginal emission reduction costs are equal to the marginal emission reduction 
benefits. It is therefore essential that the costs and benefits can be measured using the 
same (euro)criteria.
However, there are four fundamental problems in making these judgments: (1) uncer-
tainty makes it difficult to estimate the probability of extreme events and the costs of 
solution options; (2) it is unclear how the costs of adaptation should be valued and 
how the distribution question influences the valuation of emission reduction costs; 
(3) emission reduction costs and adaptation costs are difficult to compare, because 
they are evaluated on completely different time horizons; (4) it should be possible to 
solve the third problem by applying a conversion factor, but unfortunately conversion 
factors are found to be the output rather than the input of the judgment. 
 





The precautionary principle is often hailed as the solution to problems where there are 
great uncertainties, but it is not a panacea. A balance has to be struck between the risk 
that lobbies which are in danger of losing out if far-reaching measures are taken will 
irresponsibly call for deferment of those measures, and the risk that unjustified invest-
ments will be made based on unfounded fears. In short, precaution cannot replace 
judgment. The European Commission (2000) has laid down this argument in the 
proportionality principle.
In order to enable judgments to be made as well as possible in this atmosphere of 
uncertainty, a distinction has to be made between risk and uncertainty and between 
prevention and precaution. Risk and uncertainty are different concepts. Risk is 
stochastic, while uncertainty refers to a lack of knowledge which may become available 
at a later time. There may be uncertainty about risks, i.e. incomplete knowledge about 
the stochastic distribution of possible outcomes. Similarly, prevention and precaution 
are different concepts. In essence, prevention is about management of known risks, 
a judgment between the marginal costs and benefits of prevention. Precaution, by 
contrast, is about managing lack of knowledge. If precaution were to be interpreted 
as prevention, there would be no difference from the perspective of risk assessment 
between the precautionary principle and traditional risk management. The point of 
departure for the precautionary principle is that where there is uncertainty about risks 
for the environment or health, for example, it is not appropriate to wait for complete 
proof before taking action. The precautionary principle thus becomes relevant as soon 
as it seems likely that more knowledge will become available in future about the opti-
mum risk management. Waiting for that knowledge can be both a right and a wrong 
strategy. The crucial question is which uncertainties justify which actions. 
The precautionary principle is not designed to prevent risks, but is much more about 
selecting a policy line that is robust in a range of scenarios – not only extreme scena-
rios, but also a scenario in which all efforts fail to produce results. Precaution is about 
the timing of decisions in the light of developing knowledge.
2.2.3	 ethIcal	consIderatIons
Most actions cannot be argued rationally, because preferences and choices are driven 
by value judgements and are diverse. A distinction can be made here between morals 
and ethics (Reiss and Straughan 2001). Morals refer to the moral views, ideas and 
beliefs that form the basis for an assessment of what an individual feels is right or 
wrong. Ethics are a tool to enable preferences to be weighed up in a reasoned way even 
where there are divergent moral views. Ethical judgements are therefore never defi-
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nitive or provable, because the moral judgments on which they are based are also not 
definitive or provable. Ethics are therefore a method for achieving consensus in the 
midst of diverging preferences and interests, but are not a recipe for a solution. The 
appreciation of climate change is not the same everywhere, and this also applies for 
moral views on norms and responsibilities. This is partly because of regional differen-
ces in the consequences of climate change, but also because regions or countries apply 
different priorities and have different cultures. Convergence may occur, but it equally 
may not.
The notion of justice is based on more or less universal norms; fairness is slightly less 
pretentious because it takes into account a weighing of interests. Both justice and 
responsibility demand a participative approach. Virtually every sharing of costs can be 
defended by a particular interpretation of fairness principles, on a continuum whose 
extremes are the principle of ‘grandfathering’ (where rights are allocated on the basis 
of the status quo) and the principle of an equal distribution of emission rights per head 
of the world population (Rose and Stevens 1998). Ultimately the sharing of costs is 
based on a negotiation result: the concept of ‘negotiated justice’. The negotiation result 
can take account of several interpretations at one and the same time, for example 
due to a gradual shift in the relative weight of principles: tying into the present by 
assigning weight to the status quo and gradually shifting to an increasing focus on the 
future through equal emission rights, with the negotiation result determining the path 
along which this shift takes place. 
The negotiation result must be capable of interpretation in terms of fairness. There is 
a degree of consensus concerning the minimal conditions which a fairness argument 
must meet if it is to be acceptable: need (the need for socioeconomic development to 
ensure that basic human needs are first met), capacity (the economic and technologi-
cal resources to contribute to solving the problem) and responsibility (contribution to 
the cause of the problem) are in any event essential ingredients (Höhne et al. 2003), 
but these ingredients can be combined to produce very different recipes. The principle 
adopted in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
of common but differentiated responsibilities, is gradually being defined in more 
concrete terms in the successive Conferences of the Parties (CoP). 
In conclusion, widely diverging positions can be defended from an ethical perspective. 
Ethical approaches are fruitful where they offer a common platform enabling parties to 
reach agreement, but they are counter-productive and drive parties apart if they break 
down into accusations about unethical behaviour. In a heterogeneous environment it 
is better to take mutual interests and the possibilities for achieving mutual benefit as a 
starting point. Where it may be desirable from the point of view of justice and fairness 
to adopt the principle of ‘the polluter pays’, the harsh reality is that it is often the party 
that suffers damage which finds itself forced to pay. 




The climate problem is hedged in with many uncertainties. This means that the 
sense of urgency about the problem is open to manipulation, both in an alarmist 
and a complacent direction. On the one hand it can be observed that the existence of 
stakeholders in a problem offers a good guarantee for the continued existence of that 
problem, or a least the sense of urgency regarding it, especially where governments 
enter the picture as grant-providers. In the last 20 years a sizeable group of stakehol-
ders in the climate problem has grown up. On the other hand, major economic and 
political interests are tied up in the pursuit of the emission reduction policy. Energy-
intensive industries will be confronted with high costs in offsetting external envi-
ronmental effects, while the political interests are also considerable, because climate 
policy can stand in the way of economic growth and because factors such as security of 
energy supply carry great political weight. 
In an ideal situation, science would provide knowledge and politicians would deliver a 
political view. Such a division of tasks does not work optimally in the climate debate, 
however. Policymakers often lack the knowledge needed for a proper assessment of 
the scientific basis of research; there is too little acknowledgement that the research 
sometimes amounts to ‘whistling in the dark’. In addition, circular arguments arise, in 
which a political choice made ‘in the dark’ is justified by a quasi-technical choice which 
is in reality itself a political choice. Precisely because the future is so uncertain, there is 
relatively wide scope for influencing outcomes through the choice of apparently tech-
nical growth rates: population growth, rate of economic growth, degree of convergence 
of economies, changes in the carbon intensity of gdp, and so on. The values chosen for 
these growth rates have a major and sometimes decisive influence on the outcomes of 
the calculations.
Additionally, a report by the British House of Lords (2005) identifies an opposing 
mix of science and politics in the process of the IPCC. Interference by politicians in 
the tar Summary for policymakers gives rise to contradictions between the scientific 
base text and the political summary of it. The review process is also not always entirely 
smooth. The House of Lords report also points out that there is in any event a sense 
that ideology plays a role in the appointment of IPCC members. Consciously or uncon-
sciously, the margin of uncertainty is used to turn the analyses on their heads, not 
from empiricism to policy, but from policy to empiricism. 
In order to maintain public confidence in the IPCC and the urgency of the need for 
climate policy, it is essential to set the highest possible standards in terms of imparti-
ality and scientific objectivity. Knowledge does not arise as a result of political consen-





In terms of giving a lead, the	EU	has adopted a clear position, though one which is 
gradually shifting under the influence of developments in knowledge and internatio-
nal relations. At the 1.939th meeting on the environment in Luxembourg (1996), the 
Council of Ministers of the	EU	expressed the following opinion:
“Given the serious risk of such an increase and particularly the very high rate of 
change, the Council believes that global average temperatures should not exceed 
2 degrees above pre-industrial level and that therefore concentration levels lower 
than 550 ppm CO2 should guide global limitation and reduction efforts.”
The	eU	position makes no explicit judgment between the expressed wish and the 
efforts needed to fulfil it. There is a lack of proportionality between the risk that gives 
rise to the appeal to the precautionary principle on the one hand, and the efforts 
needed to reduce that risk on the other. The European Commission has however indi-
cated that it considers this proportionality to be desirable (European Commission 
2000). At the summit of 23 March 2005 (7619/05), the Council reaffirmed the 2°C 
target was confirmed and gave a commitment to a strategy and emission reduction 
target for the period between 2012 and 2020, though for the former the Council also 
stipulated that the reduction targets had to be feasible taking into account the costs 
and benefits. 
Instruments
The instruments of	eU	climate policy form an integral part of	eU	environmental 
policy. The emissions trading system is a core element of the climate policy; it is a 
thoroughly worked out system which serves as an example to the rest of the world. For 
its effectiveness, however, this system requires more stringent reduction targets than 
those that set under the Kyoto Protocol. Figure 2.1 illustrates that specific policy is also 
pursued focusing on energy and energy conservation, industry and transport. 







• See also 2001 Sustainable Transport 
Strategy
• Intermodal shifts
 - liberalisation/reforms (EU railways)
 - river and coastal navigation
 - intermodality
• Economic system, levies for use of 
infrastructure
• EU bandwidths for excise duty on fuels
• Selective: tax exemptions for fuels 
(e..g.. bio); tax breaks for hybrid cars
• Minimal share taken by biofuels
(expensive at approx. € 100 per t CO2)
• Euro-4; i now proposals for euro-5 
(diesel and other standards) (co-
benefits)
• EU covenant, voluntary reduction in 
CO2 by automotive industry
• Ratification in 2002
• Monitoring/measurement systems
• Specific measures (see rest of figure)
• Emissions trading system
- internal (EU-25 + EER)
- linking the directive on credits JI +
    CDM
- (2008), IET trading with Canada,
    Japan etc.)
Framework directive on gases (in refrigera-
tors and freezers, air-conditioning)
• Strict application of IPCC directive for large 
installations
• See Kyoto and emissions trading;
 sectorsunder trading
 - electricity and heat
 - cement, paper, steel, refineries, glass, 
ceramics
• Minimum 22% of renewables in 
electricity generation by 2010 
(projected: 18%-19%) 
• CHP directive (18% (?) in 2010) 
Energy efficiency (labelling;
minimum energy efficiency of 
domestic appliances and end 
products; covenant with industry)
• Promotion of ‘green government 
purchases’
• See also gas and electricity deregu-
lation (internal market)
• See also Kyoto and emissions trading
• Energy saving in buildings, directive
• See reform of agricultural policy (cross-compliance)
• Landfill directive (reducing methane from waste)
• Climate research programmes
• Technology programmes, technology platforms (e.g. 
hydrogen), international partnerships (e.g. methane, 
CCS, nuclear energy, nuclear fission – ITER)










The Netherlands has played a pioneering role in climate policy. Policy activism has 
however led to a fragmented, technically complex and continually changing policy. The 
Kyoto approach appears to have been laid over the top of this as an ‘extra policy layer’. 
Moreover, the policy has changed due to correction of cost-ineffective policy, especi-
ally where this resulted in budgetary problems. 
Figure 2.2 summarises present Dutch climate policy. Typical of that policy is the wide 
use of ‘covenants’, sometimes stand-alone, sometimes in conjunction with general 
policy (e.g. fiscal policy), or specific policy (e.g. standards or grants). Sizeable subsi-
dies have been deployed in specific areas, such as the environmental quality of elec-
tricity generation (meP) and energy investment allowances (eia), though sometimes 
these subsidies are also so minimal (e.g. freight transport) that the transaction costs 
are likely to be high compared with the effect achieved. The emission reduction poten-
tial within the Netherlands is limited; the Netherlands is already fairly CO2-efficient 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs 2005).










Kyoto and emissions trading
• Promotion of technically efficient fuel  
consumption
- car labelling
- (small) subsidies for freight transport
- rebate for fuel-efficient cars 
• (Mild) behaviour or campaigns 
• Implementation of EU directive on 
biofuels 
• EU automotive industry covenant
• IEA (see Industry) 
• Vary tax with fuel-efficiency; and 
hybrid/H2 car zero 
• Allocation October 2004; 206 plants;
opt-out for 93 plants
• National register, summer 2005
• NEa, with ‘monitoring protocols’
• Trading since early 2005
• Fairly low domestic emission reduction 
ratio (external) emission reduction
projects foreseen for 2010
• Covenants
- benchmark efficiency (energy-intensive  
 businesses among world’s best for  
 energy efficiency)
- mixed policy for non-energy-intensive  
 industry,
- aluminium (PFCs and CO2 reduction)
• Energy investment allowance for innova-
tive energy technologies (IEA)
• N20 reduction (e.g. fertilisers), HFCs, and 
PFCs – voluntary + ceilings
• (See also emissions trading; in 2010 only 
0.3 Mt CO2 avoided)
• Covenants
- reduced methane emissions 
 (oil/gas producers) (success))
- biomass (coal covenant)
- wind (agreed with provinces)
- benchmark efficiency (see 
Industry)
• Grants (MEP), up to 10 years
- renewables
- CHP 
• (See also emissions trading; 2010 
only 1.1 Mt CO2 avoided)
• Fiscal
- energy investment allowance (EIA)
- green taxes 
• Subsidies, director GHG reduction
- CO2, major investment projects
- OGG reduction (+ tax allowances) in  
 14 projects




- horticulture covenant (efficient energy  
 up to 2010)
- NOx and methane fire fertiliser and  
 livestock policy
• Forestry, small extra acreage
• Waste
- waste reduction, sharp reduction in  
 methane emissions 
- energy from waste
• Built-up environment
- mixed policy for housing
- energy consumption norms for   
 offices/factories; falling since 1995
- EPR (with renewables) stopped (fairly  
 expensive)
- energiebelasting, omhoog sinds 1996






The climate is changing inexorably. Given the international diversity of interests and 
priorities, there is a real risk that an internationally coordinated greenhouse gas policy 
will fail to get off the ground, or at least to an adequate degree; we shall look at this in 
more detail in the following chapters. But even if these efforts are successful, emission 
reductions cannot halt the warming up of the Earth. Adaptation to a changing climate 
will therefore be necessary whatever happens. 
From the point of view of adaptation, climate change is a regional problem: its effects 
occur everywhere, but they are felt locally and differ from one locality to the next. The 
fruits of adaptation efforts are also enjoyed at local level. Mobilising stakeholders is 
therefore easier than with a greenhouse gas policy, which requires international coor-
dination in order to curb the ‘free rider’ effect. On the other hand, the costs of adap-
tation can vary widely at local level; A (Dutch or European) policy to distribute these 
costs fairly therefore demands a degree of international coordination. 
This chapter is built up as follows. Section 3.2 summarises both the global and Dutch 
adaptation agendas from the perspective of policy relevance. These summaries show 
that the relevant adaptation issues relate mainly to water management. Adaptation 
measures in relation to water management place demands on the already scarce 
space; this is the subject of section 3.3. In the light of this, these measures are weighed 
against other spatial functions. In addition to a technical problem, therefore, there is 
also an administrative problem; this is the subject of section 3.4. 
3.2	 the	PolIcy	agenda	for	adaPtatIon
Global consequences of climate change
The consequences of climate change will probably become greater as the rise in global 
temperatures progresses. Those consequences are expected to show regional varia-
tion. Hitz and Smith (2004) bring together the results of a large number of studies on 
climate change; most studies of the consequences of climate change leave unanswered 
the question of whether the influence of climate change dominates. The extraction of 
natural resources by human beings also generally has far-reaching consequences for 
the natural environment. Some of the problems that could result from climate change 
are thus not new. 
In general, the studies show that the 2°C limit set by the European Union (EU), which 
is accepted as a guideline for policy, need not necessarily be the temperature increase 
adapting to a changing climate
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at which negative effects begin to dominate; higher temperature rises are also cited. 
The following consequences of climate change emerge in each focus area: 
• Hazards that threaten coastal areas include more flooding due to increased sea 
levels and a greater risk of storms, together with silting up of the surface water. 
• The agricultural potential, especially for cereals, will increase if there is a limited 
temperature increase of approximately 3-4 °C. The famine problem is related only 
in the final instance to agricultural output; much more important are the availabi-
lity of work for the poor and the organisation of world trade. 
• Wide regional differences are predicted in changes in the availability of water. 
On balance, little can be said about the availability of water as a result of global 
warming. A world agricultural market could largely accommodate the consequen-
ces of changes in the availability of water. 
• Theoretically, global warming could foster the spread of diseases such as malaria. 
However, there are many ways of halting the spread of such diseases, which are 
primarily a result of poverty.
• Leemans and Eickhout (2004) expect future climate change to have a major impact 
on existing ecosystems. They do however see differences in the ability to adapt. 
Changes in the climate generally take place at the expense of the wealth of species. 
The more rapid the changes, the greater the consequences. The most afforested 
ecosystems, it is argued, are capable of adapting to a temperature change of only 
0.05 °C per decade. 
Why should the Netherlands adapt?
The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (mNP	2005) has compiled an 
extensive inventory of the effects of climate change in the Netherlands. Table 3.1 is 
based on this inventory, though the final four columns are a policy-specific interpre-
tation of the report. For the government, adaptation issues are only relevant if policy 
can make a difference. This question is answered broadly in four steps in table 3.1. The 
focus is more on the method than the actual valuation, which is in any event to some 
extent a value judgment and therefore open to discussion. 
The first two questions are concerned with evaluating the consequences of climate 
change. A monetary measure has been chosen for this, without this implying that only 
the financial consequences have been counted. Consequences are only relevant for policy 
if they can be reduced or prevented with adaptation policy. The costs of that policy must 
be in proportion to the monetary magnitude of the consequences; this means that small 
consequences are also worth specific policy provided that policy is cost-effective. The 
final question looks at the added value of preventive policy. The consequences of climate 
change become visible only in the relatively long term; if something is to be done about 
this now, preventive policy must have added value compared with reactive policy at some 
point in the future. If there is no point in prevention, but the policy will later have added 
value, policy today is at best worthwhile as a way of building up a budgetary reserve. 
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Table 3.1 shows that after answering the above four questions, the problems in relation 
to water management stand out as an issue with major consequences and high added 
value for preventive policy. For this reason, the rest of this chapter focuses on water 
policy. This does not mean that water policy is the only relevant topic; there are for 
example problems associated with the investment cycle, in which preventive policy has 
clear added value. Nonetheless, those problems are not discussed further in this chap-
ter, since when highlighting such problems the solution becomes more or less obvious. 







Average Now +1 °C, rising to maximum +6 °C 
Nature Northward relocation of species, increase in seven and 
generally occurring species, decline in northern and specific 
species
Health Probable decline in gen. average relative mortality
Agriculture Diseases/pests: more common
Health Malaria in the Netherlands
Extreme, heat Now 3x as many hot days, further increase in severity and frequency later
Health Increase in relative mortality in hot periods
Extreme, cold Now half as many cold days, falling trend
Tourism Reduced ice-skating opportunities, less chance of Elfsteden-
tocht ice-skating race (though still possible)
Reduced skiing opportunities
Health
Seasons Longer summer, earlier spring
Nature Ecosystem disruption, e.g. egg-laying dates, appearance of 
animals, blooming of spring plants
Agriculture Longer growing season
Tourism Extended tourist season, more periods with good weather
Health Lyme disease: tick bites doubled in 10 years
Water  
temperature
Sea water becomes warmer
Nature Change in plankton population, possible consequences 
higher up the food chain. Reduction in shellfish in Wadden 
Sea, leading to decline in certain bird species
Tourism Blue algae-related infections
Rhine temperature now +3° C., partly due to climate. Rising under conditions
Industry Occasional constraints on take-up of cooling water
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Further relocation of mobile 
species, climate relocation of  
400 km/century is too rapid for 












Continuing development Very likely Limited  
(N.B.: positive)
Low Low
Greater potential harvest losses Limited Limited Low Low




Further increase in heat-related 
mortality, limited loss of years 
of life




Further decrease in chance of icy 
periods (less than proportionate)
Very likely Small Low Moderate
Further reduction in skiing season 
and area
Very likely Small Low Low
Fall in cold-related mortality Very likely Small Low Low
Likely
Further disruption in the food 
chain
Likely Limited Low Low
Continuing extension; higher 





Low Moderate (crop 
transitions)
Netherlands more attractive 







Further increase Likely Small High Low
Likely
Further shifts with possible step 
change in ecosystems
Likely Small, with 
uncertainty
Low Low
Further increase Very likely Small Moderate Low
Considerable chance of  
restrictions











Now approx. 20% more; the relationship between seasons will also 
change: summer more, winter less 
Extreme: rainfall Now > 0% more days with > 1, 20 or 2 mm. This trend will 
continue, more days of extreme precipitation
Agriculture More frequent damage
General Greater nuisance
Extreme, drought More dry years and rain shortages, though very variable
Agriculture More frequent damage
General, drinking water
Evaporation (summer) Proportionate with temperature increase, in 2100 +4% - 16%
Wind Reduction in number of storms (since 162); possibly more 
extreme storms in the future
Rise in sea level Due to melting of land ice, discharge of seawater and soil erosion. 
Now +20 cm, expectation is +10 - +4 cm (200) and +20 cm - 
+110 cm (2100). Uncertain chance of much greater increase
Safety Greater flooding risk
River discharges
Winter Higher norm discharge rate (Rhine from 1,000 m3 to 16,000 m3), 
increase of 3% - 10% for the Rhine and from % - 10% for the 
Meuse in 200
Safety Greater flooding risk
Summer Average lower discharges, minimum 10% - 0% lower in 200
Industry




Level slightly increased; this will continue mainly in winter.  
Fluctuations increase
Water management
1 This table is a modified copy of a table in ‘Effects of Climate Change’, Environmental and Nature Plan-
ning Agency (Milieu en Natuurplanbureau) 2005, pp. 12-13. The last three columns are our interpreta-
tion of the main text in this report.
2 The chance of an effect occurring is conditional, with the physical change referred to as the condition. 
For example: a long growing season is virtually certain if a shift takes place in the length of the seasons. 
However, that shift is anything but certain.
3 The consequences of the realisation of this effect are indicated here in monetarised form. It is not there-
fore only a matter of damage which is intrinsically monetary in itself. A global division has been chosen 
using the categories ‘small’, ‘limited’, ‘sizeable’. The uncertainties surrounding a number of items reflect 
the uncertainty regarding the value of a change, not the uncertainty as to whether the change will take 
place (column ‘Chance’).
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Continuing development Virtually 
certain
Limited Moderate Low
Continuing development Virtually 
certain
Limited Low High, invest-
ment cycle, 
spatial options
Continuing development Very likely Limited Moderate Low
Salt intrusion Very likely Limited Moderate Low
Linked to temperature
Now: very likely; future: uncertain
Now: certain; certainty decreases with time
Increasing further Virtually 
certain
Sizeable High High, reserving 
options
Varies with increase
Increasing further Virtually 
certain
Sizeable High High, reserving 
options
Further reduction leads to low 
discharges, greater restrictions
Very likely Small Moderate Low
Likely





4 The added value of policy indicates the extent to which harmful effects can be avoided or mitigated by 
policy choices, both proactive and reactive. This added value is divided into the categories ‘low’, ‘moder-
ate’ or ‘high’.
5 Which proportion of the policy added value is exclusively preventive?
6 There are at least two problems with the monetarisation of the effect here. First, the monetarisation of 
biodiversity is extremely uncertain. Secondly, in this specific case, the disutility (the negative value) is not 






The standards for the primary flood defences in the Netherlands originate from the 
Delta Commission (Deltacommissie, 1960) which, following the flood disaster of 1953, 
was given the task of finding ways of protecting the Netherlands against flooding. The 
Commission formed a view based on a cost-benefit analysis, in which at the optimum 
protection level the marginal costs of a further increase in flood safety were equal to 
the marginal benefits. It is striking that the standards established then still serve to 
this day as a guideline for flood protection. Climate change is gradually increasing the 
physical flooding risks. However, an even greater threat is posed by growing popula-
tion density and rising prosperity, which have led to a sharp increase in the value of 
the assets to be protected. A cost-benefit analysis on this basis would result in more 
stringent safety standards. In addition, prosperity generally fosters risk avoidance: 
safety is a luxury commodity. This could be expected to have raised the protection 
standard further. The reform of the Flood Defences Act (Wet op de waterkering) seeks 
to take into account the growing population density in areas protected by dykes and 
the increasing economic value by stipulating the publication of a report every ten years 
on the risk and impact of flooding and the consequences for safety standards. The first 
such report is scheduled to be published in around 2008.
The Delta Commission set a standard for the protection western coasts of the provin-
ces of Noord-Holland and Zuid-Holland a frequency of occurrence ratio of 1:10,000 
times per year; the standard for the flood defences in the coastal provinces of Zeeland 
in the south and of Friesland and Groningen in the north was 1:4,000 per year. With 
regard to river flooding, in consultation with the Province of Gelderland the Minister 
of Transport, Public Works and Water Management established the norm discharge 
rate from the River Rhine at 18,000 cubic metres per second, with an incidence proba-
bility of 1:3,000. This meant that the majority of the dykes had to be greatly reinfor-
ced. However, implementation of this project led to so much public unrest that in 1975 
the Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management ordered the Becht 
Commission to re-examine the norm. The Commission concluded that a much lower 
norm of 1:1,250 per year could be safely applied. The Commission calculated that this 
was equivalent to a norm discharge rate of 16,500 cubic metres per second (Commis-
sie Rivierdijken 1977). After persistent public resistance to the strengthening of river 
dykes, the Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management installed the 
first Boertien Commission, which recommended lowering the norm discharge rate to 
15,000 cubic metres per second. For the River Meuse, a second Boertien Commission 
recommended a norm discharge rate of 3,650 cubic metres per second, with an inci-
dence probability of 1:1,250 per year (Commissie Watersnood Maas 1994). The initi-
ally high safety standards for the major rivers were thus steadily reduced in response 
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to public pressure, and the implementation of projects was deferred further and 
further into the future. Public support among those living around the rivers proved 
to be extremely weak, with half the population squarely against dyke reinforcement 
(Hufen 1998). The floods in 1993 and 1995 increased the sense of urgency only tempo-
rarily. Some of the flood defences do not comply with the current norms.
Meanwhile, the realisation is beginning to dawn that climate change could pose 
further problems for the Dutch river delta in the more distant future. The Commis-
sion on Water in the 21st Century (Commissie Waterbeheer 21e eeuw) has developed 
water supply scenarios for the Rhine and Meuse rivers. Table 3.2 shows that the norm 
water discharge rate has been raised further. The margins of uncertainty in this norm 
discharge rate are considerable, however: translated into the required dyke height, the 
margin of uncertainty is approximately one metre. 
Table	3.2	 Norm	water	discharge	rate	in	different	climate	scenarios	(m3/s)
Present minimum medium maximum
Projection year: 200
Temperature +0. °C +1 °C +2 °C
Rhine 16,000 16,400 16,00 1,600
Meuse 3,00 3,0 4,10 4,60
Projection year: 2100
Temperature +1 °C +2 °C +4 °C
Rhine 16,00 1,600 1,000
Meuse 4,10 4,60 ,320
Source: Baseline report by the Commission on Water in the 21st Century (WB21 2000b)
A norm water discharge rate of 18,000 cubic metres per second is seen as a maximum 
for the Rhine, because a higher rate of discharge would flood the dykes in Germany. If 
Germany were to raise its dykes further, contrary to current international agreements, 
the norm discharge rate in the Netherlands could be increased further. A changing 
climate could prompt such a move.
The Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (riVm	2004: 80) 
has highlighted the selective way in which new knowledge is used: knowledge which 
indicates a reduction in base levels tends to find its way into policy more readily than, 





Given the uncertainty surrounding the likely developments, adaptation to climate 
change must be aimed at robustness. Urbanisation, agriculture, nature and infra-
structure place competing claims on the available space which together exceed the 
size of the Netherlands. Space is a scarce commodity in the Netherlands which must 
be handled with care. Choices have to be made between acceptance (of flooding risks 
in certain localities), space (relocation of functions and/or releasing space for flexible 
water defence) and technology (pumping stations and flood defences). 
The rivers
There is a growing realisation that the danger of flooding could increase as a result 
of climate change. In response to this, the focus of attention has broadened, to take 
in not just vertical water protection (strengthening dykes), but also horizontal water 
retention in the sense of creating more space for water. The policy memorandum 
‘Room for the River’ (Ruimte voor de rivier 1996) contains a commitment to reserve 
and create space for the rivers in the interests of safety and to limit the damage from 
flooding. However, pressure on the available space is increasing in the Netherlands 
and the tendency is if anything to provide the rivers with less rather than more space. 
In this sense, the policy memorandum represents a break with the past.
There are three options for tackling flooding risks (Klijn et al. 2004). The first is the 
usual strengthening and raising of the river dykes, combined with maintenance of the 
channel. The second offers room for the rivers in the form of a series of flood plains 
which are allowed to flood at high water. Existing dyked areas would have to be split 
up into smaller dyked sections to accommodate this, so the economic damage would 
be minimised when the flood plains were under water. High standards would have to 
be set for the dyking of economically valuable areas. A third option is to configure the 
space set aside for the rivers in such a way that new channels are created which are 
used only at high water.
The timing of these different solution options varies. The first two options could be 
carried out in phases, but the opportunities for phasing in the third option are limited. 
There is great uncertainty regarding the development of the necessary run-off capa-
city; it could transpire that the first approach based on vertical reinforcement, which is 
also the cheapest option, is ultimately inadequate. It could also turn out that the third 
approach, which is the most expensive, was ultimately not necessary.
The Commission on Water in the 21st Century (wb21 2000a) has defined water as a 
spatial problem with the ‘three-stage strategy for water quantity’, based on the follo-
wing priority order: retain – store – discharge. This priority order is based partly on 
the desire to accommodate water shortages during periods of drought. The Commis-
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sion estimates that in the period to 2015 approximately 40,000 hectares will be 
needed for the main water system and a further 15,000 hectares for the regional water 
systems. Between 2015 and 2050 a further 20,000 and 35,000 hectares, respectively, 
would need to be added.
Land consolidation and land use
The problems of water management are not limited to the major rivers, and climate 
change is not the only cause of problems in other areas. In the lower regions of the 
Netherlands, in particular, subsidence due to soil erosion is a problem, caused by oxida-
tion of the peaty soil in moorland areas on contact with air. The decline in soil levels can 
amount to as much as a metre per century, and will lead to an increase in the amount of 
damage in the event of flooding. The erosion also leads to more backing up of water as 
the major rivers discharge into the sea; the rise in sea levels exacerbates this problem.
The soil erosion process is exacerbated by low groundwater levels. In many places 
those levels are actively reduced to facilitate building and agricultural activity. Howe-
ver, higher water levels are desirable in moorland pasture areas in order to retain 
water for longer, combat drought and slow down the process of soil erosion (Vrom-
raad 2002). Creating more space for water would therefore benefit a sustainable water 
management regime, especially in the regional water systems. 
The sea
There are currently a number of weak links in the Dutch coastline (RIVM 2004). Coas-
tal defences are of course by definition defensive, but this does not mean they have to 
be inflexible. The sand replenishment policy is effective in maintaining the coastline, 
but in addition, coastal defence systems further inland are also a realistic option in 
some localities, as long as the necessary space is set aside for this.
See water levels are just one of the relevant factors in coastal defence; wind, wind 
direction and wave height are at least as important. The knowledge about waves, in 
particular, is fairly recent and is increasing gradually. Waves probably impose a consi-
derably heavier burden than the hydraulic parameters allow for. On the other hand, 
the frequency of storms has reduced in the last fifty years, though of course this offers 
no guarantees for the coming century.
The costs of water policy
The Delta Commission regarded spending 0.5% of GDP on measures to protect against 
the risk of flooding as ‘by no means infeasible’. Current spending is below this by 
around a factor of 3. This would seem to be on the (very) low side, because the value 
of the assets to be protected has increased significantly (expected value = probability 
times effect) and because increased prosperity also influences the risk preference 
(the price of risk). Both factors justify establishing a lower accepted flood risk than 
adapting to a changing climate
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at present. What is particularly striking about estimates of the costs of increasing 
flood safety (Rooijers et al. 2004; Klijn et al. 2004; WB21 2000a) is that they lie so 
far below the cost-benefit norm applied by the Delta Commission. The conclusion is 
that the expected expenditure due to climate change in the next century will remain 
completely manageable, even if water policy becomes significantly more expensive due 
to that climate change. 
Physical planning policy is largely a matter of choosing from various options. Regu-
lation is needed to ensure that investments are not made in localities which will later 
be designated as wet landscape areas, since this would make that designation more 
difficult. 
3.4	 water	as	an	admInIstratIve	Problem
There are several administrative aspects relating to the draining of the major rivers 
in relation to climate change. It became clear in the foregoing section that the neces-
sary measures can have far-reaching physical planning consequences. It is uncertain 
whether the statutory instruments needed to claim the required space are adequate. 
Measures which have a radical impact on the physical landscape are conditional on 
sufficient public support. 
3.4.1	 legal	Instruments
Ensuring safety from the danger of flooding from the sea and major rivers is the 
responsibility of the State, in conjunction with the regional authorities. The main 
outlines of the policy are established at central government level in the policy memo-
randum on water management (Nota voor de Waterhuishouding). Plans developed 
by central government often have consequences for physical planning, creating an 
interface between water management policy and physical planning policy. At the heart 
of this interface is the weighing of spatial functions against each other. At govern-
ment level, however, there is no coordination between water management policy 
and physical planning policy (Groothuijse and Van Rijswick 2005)., and elements of 
policy formulated at central government level are sometimes lost in the translation to 
regional level due to physical planning considerations. Central government formulates 
the water management policy based on a unilateral social interest. More interests are 
at stake at regional level, and these have to be weighed against each other. From the 
point of view of safety, the result of this exercise can be regarded as unsatisfactory.
The government needs greater powers to steer the implementation of major water 
management projects. The present statutory instruments offer some scope for this 
(key planning decisions), but fall short of what is needed in practice (Van Buuren and 
Laninga-Busch 2005). The question is whether setting aside physical planning areas 
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should be seen as indicative policy statements or concrete policy decisions. The useful-
ness of an indicative policy statement depends on the cooperation of local authorities. 
In a concrete policy decision all relevant interests must be taken into account, inclu-
ding local interests. This makes large-scale use of this instrument by central govern-
ment less appropriate, and means that the commitment of provinces and water boards 
is essential. In reality this means that recourse is sought to the usual administrative 
influence of central government. All in all, the responsible ministers consider these 
options to be insufficient.
The Advisory Committee on Water Management Legislation (Commissie van Advies 
inzake de Waterstaatwetgeving) was recently asked to assess the applicability of these 
statutory instruments for large-scale physical planning exercises in relation to the anti-
cipated discharge from the major rivers. According to the Committee, there is no need 
to develop new legislation for water management and the new Spatial Planning Act (Wet 
ruimtelijke ordening, WRO) could in time prove to be effective for the creation of protec-
ted zones, buffer zones and areas reserved for wet landscape functions (Van Buuren 
and Laninga-Busch 2005). The new Act will increase the powers of central government 
to achieve its own physical planning objectives. One condition is that there should be 
agreement between the Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 
and the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (Vrom).
3.4.2	 PublIc	suPPort
Physical planning decisions that lead to urbanisation are to all intents and purpo-
ses irreversible. The high costs of de-urbanisation mean that areas designated for 
construction (‘red’ planning areas) will not be easy to change into designated ‘green’ 
areas (nature) or, in the case of water management, into ‘blue’ areas (water). Physical 
planning thus by definition has long-term consequences. The question now is whether 
water management can dominate the use of space. Put simply, can ‘red’ follow ‘blue’, 
or must ‘blue’ follow ‘red’? In the past the importance of safe water management has 
been subordinated to other interests, both physical planning-related and financial. 
The importance of safe water management was less firmly embedded in the social and 
administrative bedrock.
The tensions between the various administrative layers became visible in the prepara-
tions for the key planning decision Room for the River. At provincial and local level, 
agricultural interests and housing interests weighed more heavily than at central 
government level. The ‘interactive decision-making’ meant that interests contributed 
by central government were weighed against provincial and local interests. While this 
is not a mistaken approach in itself, in matters of national importance it is key that 
this should result in a better ‘fit’ in the local context rather than a watering down of 
national objectives. 
adapting to a changing climate
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Measures to increase flood safety require support. In the case of the large rivers, which 
fall under central government responsibility, this not only means support among local 
administrators, but also among the local population. Hufen (1998) argues that lack of 
public support has been a key factor in faltering administration, which in turn has led 
to the watering down and delays in the original plans to raise the safety level of the 
large rivers to a disaster probability of 1:3,000. The public memory of major catastrop-
hes such as the flood disaster of 1953 is relatively short. 
In the light of climate change and the intensification of the water cycle it is expected 
to bring, the ambitions of the key planning decision do not go far enough. This means 
that there are currently no preparations under way for reserving proposed wet land-
scape areas for further measures. The consequences of climate change place demands 
on the administration to curb the risk of major flooding due to extreme discharges 
from the major rivers. Against this backdrop, the preparation of the key planning deci-
sion Room for the River is no more than a first step. By taking a key planning decision, 
the government establishes its position for the longer term. It will not be simple to 




The European Water Framework Directive (2000/60/ec) forms the basis for inter-
national coordination. It focuses is mainly on environmental objectives in relation to 
water quality and sustainable water management and pays scant attention to amelio-
rating the consequences of flooding; that falls within the scope of the (international) 
River Basin Management Plan. The Water Framework Directive pays no attention to 
the detailing of quantitative water management. The Directive was drawn up on the 
basis of the collaborative model developed by the Rhine riparian States, which work 
together in the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR). 
The ICPR plays a part in the formulation of the River Basin Management Plan for the 
Rhine, and devotes wide attention to flooding risks.
Retaining water in the upper basin area is of little importance in practice for extreme 
discharges, because in those situations the soil is generally already saturated. Some 
gains could however be made in the longer term from changed land use. Measures 
have been taken on a large scale to lower water levels and promote discharge. These 
increase the local discharge capacity and therefore raise the risk of flooding down-
stream. To some extent these measures could be implemented with less downstream 
impact. 
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If climate change increases the discharge of water from the Rhine, new ways will have 
to be found of distributing the flooding between Germany and the Netherlands. Both 
countries, but in particular Germany, can benefit from this. In Germany there is in 
principle scope for extra buffering of Rhine water, but measures to combat flooding 
are also possible in the Netherlands. Preferably, measures should be taken where they 
are cheapest. 







It makes no difference for the climate whereabouts in the world greenhouse gases 
(ghgs) are emitted or absorbed. Since emission reduction measures can be taken 
anywhere, their potential and cost-effectiveness is not determined by the specific 
national situation, but by the global situation. From a technical point of view, there-
fore, emission reduction as a solution to the climate problem is a global challenge. 
This chapter therefore looks at emission reduction as a technical strategic issue from a 
global perspective . 
The magnitude of the emission reduction challenge is dictated by the contributions of 
the various greenhouse gases, their sinks and the anticipated increase or decrease in 
emissions over time. The following questions are central here:
• What are the main sources of emission and absorption in terms of their magnitude 
and dynamics, by sectors and by countries/continents?
• How far would emissions have to be curbed in order to achieve the European 
Union’s (eU) 2°C target? 
• Within what timeframe would emission levels have to be reduced? 
If we focus on emission reduction policy, in what directions do we need to look for 
solutions: 
• What are the main technical options as regards reduction potential and maturity? 
The more pressing the time, the greater the need for available technologies which 
can be fitted into existing systems and practices. 
• How cost-effective are the various options? The importance of cost-effectiveness 
increases as the need to engender support for climate policy spreads to developing 
countries. 
• What is their synergy with other options, so that options can benefit from each 
other, and what synergy do they show with other social objectives such as security 
of energy supplies and economic development? 
• Does today’s knowledge offer a reasonable perspective of timely emission reducti-
ons in the first half of this century?
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 translates the EU’s 2°C target into an 
emission reduction programme for CO2 and other greenhouse gases (oggs) for the 
next fifty years and shows the gulf compared with a baU (Business As Usual) situa-
tion. This first exploration produces four emission reduction routes: three for CO2 and 
one for oggs. The potential contribution of these routes is then examined in sections 
emission reduction as a technical strategic issue 
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4.3 to 4.6 inclusive. Section 4.7 derives a global climate strategy from the reasoning 
followed, based on the criteria of cost-effectiveness, the importance of involving 
developing countries and the timing up to around 2050 from the perspective of risk 
reduction. The Council believes that this strategy should also shape the efforts of the 





The	eU	has opted for the 2°C target, i.e. limiting the rise in average global temperatu-
res to no more than 2°C compared with the pre-industrial situation. Based on current 
knowledge (iPCC 2001; Goldemberg 2000), indications are that the concentration of 
carbon in the atmosphere must not be more of than around 550 ppmv CO2 equivalents 
in the year 2100, made up of 450-470 ppmv CO2 and 80-100 ppmv CO2 equivalent 
oggs. As ghgs remain in the atmosphere for a long time, it can to some extent be 
said that there is a CO2 budget for the coming century. Keeping the maximum concen-
tration to 450 ppmv CO2 will require a rate of emissions from year to year that will 
prove far from simple to achieve, even technically, leaving aside the required interna-
tional coordination (see chapter 5). Although in this emission reduction programme 
global emissions can be as much as 20% above 1990 levels in 2025, they must reach 
their peak around that time. Thereafter, according to Elzen and Meinshausen (2005), 
they will have to fall quickly enough to ensure that by 2050 CO2 emissions have redu-
ced by around 30-35% compared with 1990 (depending partly on the reduction of 
oggs). After 2050 emissions would need to fall further until emission and absorption 
rates were equalised in 2100. The first half of this century is therefore a crucial period 
for emission reductions. 
4.2.2	 the	gulf	comPared	wIth	‘busIness	as	usual’
Using the ‘Kaya Identity’ enables the rate of growth in energy-related CO2 emissions 
to be analysed into a number of constituent variables, namely the growth in the popu-
lation, per capita gross domestic product (gdP), the energy per unit gdP and the CO2 
emissions per unit energy, respectively. Among these factors, only energy consumption 
and the carbon intensity of the energy are open to influence. For a Business As Usual 
(baU) scenario, the forecast by the International Energy Agency (iea 2004) suggests 
that global gdp will grow by around 3% per year. Even if the energy intensity in baU 
scenarios falls by 1.5% per year (estimates in the literature range between 1.2-1.5% 
per year), this means that energy consumption in the period up to 2050 will grow by 
1.5% per year (Pacala and Socolow 2004a). The iea expects little change in the carbon 
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intensity of the energy mix. This means that in a baU scenario CO2 emissions will rise 
by around 1.5% per year up to 2050. The cumulative emissions in 2050 will be 100% 
higher than today, whereas the 2°C target set by the	eU	requires an emission pathway 
which, after initially rising, ends up around 30% lower than today in 2050. Translated 
into an emissions budget, this implies a cumulative emission reduction challenge of 
approximately 175 GtC in the period up to 2050 (Pacala and Socolow 2004a; 2004b; 
Hawkins and Williams 2005; Stokes et al. 2004; iPCC 2001). 
4.3	 route	1:	greater	energy	effIcIency
 
Without improvements in energy efficiency, population growth and rising prosperity 
will inevitably lead to a virtually proportionate growth in energy consumption, which 
with the present energy system will mean a virtually proportionate increase in emis-
sions. baU scenarios always assume a gradual spontaneous improvement in energy 
efficiency, both in end consumption and in the conversion of primary energy to energy 
for end consumption.
Efficiency improvements are to a large extent achieved through the gradual penetra-
tion of new, more efficient equipment and capital goods. In the transport sector, an 
improvement by a factor of 3 appears technically achievable. There are still a great 
many gains to be made with buildings, too. Estimates suggest that a combination of 
improved efficiency in end use and in electricity generation could open the way to a 
reduction in energy intensity by 2% per year. It would therefore seem that energy effi-
ciency can make a very major contribution to achieving the required CO2 reduction in 
the period up to 2050 compared with the BAU scenario. The potential reduction is 3.4 
GtC per year in 2050. 
Energy efficiency is sensitive to policy. The degree to which technical possibilities are 
achieved also depends greatly on prices, which can also be influenced through policy. 
In the Dutch situation, too, the technical potential for efficiency improvements is of 
the order of 2% per annum, but with the currently proposed policy it is likely that less 
than 1.5% per annum will be achieved (Daniëls and Farla 2006: 50).
In order to maximise the contribution of improved energy intensity to resolving the 
climate problem, we take as a basis the optimistic hypothesis that a global improve-
ment of 2.3% per annum can be achieved (2% in efficiency improvements +0.3% struc-
tural effect). A powerful and successful drive towards energy efficiency could enable 
this to be realised, though it would be an unprecedented success if such a tempo were 
to be achieved quickly at global level and then sustained for successive decades.
The assumed optimistic improvement in energy intensity reduces the upward effect 
on emissions growth of GDP growth from 3% per year to 0.7% per year, averaged over 
emission reduction as a technical strategic issue 
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the period 2000-2030. As long as the energy mix does not change, emissions will grow 
even in this optimistic scenario by more than 40% up to 2050, however, whereas to 
achieve the 2°C target a reduction of 30% is desirable. Improving energy efficiency 
alone will therefore not be enough to achieve the eu’s climate objective. If the aim was 
to bridge this gulf through a change in the energy mix, the proportion of fossil fuels in 
the growing energy consumption would not be able to increase from 80% to 82% as in 
a baU scenario (iea 2004), but would have to fall to around 40%. 
4.4	 route	2:	alterIng	the	global	energy	mIx
Even with a far-reaching improvement in energy efficiency, economic growth will be 
accompanied by rising CO2 emissions. This makes the development of low-emission 
energy an urgent requirement. Section 4.4.1 discusses the key conditions for achieving 
emission reductions via the energy mix. Section 4.4.2 looks at how the energy mix 




Coal is the crucial fossil fuel
The main fossil fuels are gas, oil and coal. Finding an alternative to gas has the lowest 
priority, as gas has the lowest CO2 emissions per unit energy, while coal has the 
highest. There is therefore if anything an argument for extending the use of gas in the 
coming decades, especially at the expense of coal. The main application for this incre-
ase would be in the generation of electricity. The iea is predicting an increase in the 
share of gas in electricity generation from 36% to 47% by 2030.
Looking for alternatives for oil is more relevant, both from the perspective of climate 
policy and with a view to securing energy supplies. A relevant aspect for the climate 
is that oil is currently responsible for 41% of CO2 emissions; according to the baU 
growth path, this falls slightly to 39%. Security of energy supplies is at least as urgent 
as the climate (especially in a baU development), because the peak for conventional 
oil is coming into view and the transport sector is dependent almost entirely on oil. 
Another threat to the security of energy supplies is the heavy dependency on just a few 
regions, in particular the Middle East and Russia. In the words of	eU	Commissioner 
Piebalgs: “By 2030 Europe will be dependent on imports for 90% of its oil consump-
tion and 80% of its gas consumption; these trends are unbroken, despite Europe’s 
commitment to developing renewable energy.”
Coal is the most relevant fuel from a climatic point of view. Coal use is growing by 
1.4% annually. Almost 70% of coal used is burned in the generation of electricity, the 
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fastest-growing of all sectors, and this is projected to grow to 79% by 2030. This will 
take the share of coal in global generating capacity to almost 40%. In a baU scena-
rio, the share of coal in the primary energy chain remains virtually unchanged (23% 
today, 22% in 2030), partly because the capital stock of power stations is geared to 
coal. Coal is relevant particularly because of its high carbon intensity and wide avai-
lability. Consumption of the existing stocks of oil and gas fits within the CO2 budget 
for the coming decades, while the use of coal does not. For many countries, coal is the 
primary option for energy supply security (McFarland et al. 2004; ciab/iea 2005). 
Moreover, coal is becoming more important because in the near future it will be possi-
ble to use gasification technology to make both clean gas and liquid fuel for transport 
from coal. This means that if the oil price should end up at a permanently high price, 
and if conventional oil stocks should peak between 2015 and 2035, the role of coal 
could become even more important. 
Electricity: the crucial sector
Electricity and transport are far and away the most relevant sectors when it comes to 
addressing CO2 emissions via the energy mix because they take the largest share of 
total energy consumption and are the strongest growing sectors (see table 4.1). In a 
baU scenario, it is anticipated that in 2050 no less than three-quarters of CO2 emis-






2002 2030 2002 2030 2002 2030
Electricity 3. 43. 40. 4. 3. 3.1
Transport 20. 22. 1.1 1.2 2.2 30.
Industry 1.4 14.6 23. 16.3 13. 12.3
Built-up environment + services 13.6 11. 13.0 10. 14. 12.3
Other .0 .0 .3 6.2 6.0 .6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: IEA 2004: 75
Reducing emissions in the electricity sector is important in the short term. There are 
four reasons why electricity is a key sector. First, the sector is large and consumption 
is growing strongly, especially in developing countries, and a great deal of energy is 
lost in the conversion process. Second, table 4.2 shows that coal takes the largest share 
in the supply of energy for electricity generation, at 39%. Thirdly, the scale of electri-
city generation offers great benefits of scale in making the process carbon-neutral. And 
finally, many old power stations – especially in the oeCd countries – are in urgent 
emission reduction as a technical strategic issue 
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need of replacement, while the total number of power stations is set to be increased 
significantly in the near future to meet the growing demand for electricity. Given the 
long life of power stations, there is therefore a closing window of opportunity.
The transport sector can currently make a limited contribution to mitigating emissions 
by addressing the fuel mix. The mitigating effect of first-generation biofuels (bio-etha-
nol, biodiesel) is limited because their production generates relatively large amounts 
of CO2. Large-scale use of hydrogen is unlikely before 2050 for a number of reasons. 
Substitution of fossil fuels in the transport sector is therefore an issue for the longer 
term. The remaining stocks of conventional oil will therefore undoubtedly be used 





2002 2030 2002 2030 2002 2030 2002 2030
Fossil fuels 62 64 63 2 4 
· Coal 3 3 3 33 22 16 4 4
· Oil  4 6 2 4 2 12 
· Gas 1 30 1 2 3 4 1 26
Nuclear energy 1  23 1 1 11 2 3
Hydropower 16 13 13 11 1 1 23 16
Other renewable fuels 2 6 3 10 0 2 1 3
Source: IEA 2004: 197
Developing countries: the crucial region
Table 4.3 shows that the anticipated growth in energy consumption will take place 
primarily in developing countries. A significant and growing proportion of the emis-
sion reduction measures will therefore have to be taken outside the oeCd, and especi-




OECD 2.% 42% 2%
Transitional countries 10.3% % 43%
Developing countries 34,% 4%a 123%
Total 23 GtC 3 GtC 62% 
a According to the weto-ref scenario: 41% in 2030 (European Union 2003). Cumulative emis-
sions in 2000: 47%, and in 2030 more than in the developed countries (MITI).
Source: IEA 2004: 75
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4.4.2	 results	vIa	the	energy	mIx
The foregoing made clear that coal, electricity and developing countries are crucial 
factors in achieving emission reductions via the energy mix. It also established that 
achieving emission reductions via the energy sector (improved efficiency and different 
energy mix) will require a reduction in the global share taken by fossil fuels in the 
growing energy consumption, from 80% now to around 40% in 2050. It immediately 
follows from this that the share of carbon-neutral energy in total energy consumption 
would then have to increase from its present 20% to 60% by 2050, instead of falling 
as anticipated in baU scenarios. This increase would have to be achieved against the 
backdrop of rapidly growing electricity consumption. The question is how this could 
be done:, i.e. via which combination of modern renewable energy, nuclear energy and 
clean fossil energy.
In BAU scenario no growth in share of carbon-neutral energy 
According to the baU models developed by the iea, it is the growth in consumption 
which brings about the fall in the proportion of carbon-neutral energy. The present 
20% of carbon-neutral energy can be broken down into 6.7% nuclear energy and 13.5% 
renewables. Although the iea expects the production of nuclear energy to grow in 
terms of kWh, no growth is foreseen in market share. Instead, that share will fall from 
6.7% to 4.6% in 2030 as several countries do not replace nuclear power stations that 
have reached the end of their life. The iea also expects the share of renewable energy 
to remain at 13.5% in the coming decades. This stabilisation is the net result of the 
following shifts:
• The share of traditional biomass will fall from 7.3% to 5.6% in 2030. 
• The share of modern biomass will grow from 3.4% to 4.1% in 2030. 
• Solar and wind power will together triple from 0.5% to 1.6%. 
• Hydropower will stabilise at 2.2%. The volume growth will be just enough to keep 
pace with the growth in energy consumption. 
Together, the new renewables (modern biomass, solar and wind power) will grow 
thanks to government support from a share of 4% in 2002 to a share of just 5.7% in 
2030, despite a doubling in volume. If the iea forecast in a baU development is taken 
as a basis, then there are only two serious options for an emission reduction route 
involving a carbon-neutral energy mix: nuclear energy or modern renewable energy. 
Betting on modern renewable energy?
If the share of nuclear energy does not increase, but stabilises at 6% (the production 
in terms of kWh will then still grow), the share of modern renewable energy would 
have to increase from 4% in 2002 to around 46% in 2030. Clearly such a major leap 
forwards is virtually impossible, but it is nonetheless discussed below.
emission reduction as a technical strategic issue 
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In order to realise the required share of modern renewable energy, fossil energy would 
have to be eliminated almost entirely from the electricity sector, and this would more-
over have to take place within the next few decades. This is because electricity genera-
tion accounts for around 35% of primary energy, and shifts within the electricity sector 
therefore impact on a third of the total energy mix. The electricity generation sector 
just happens to be on the verge of a major new wave of capital investment. Since all 
these new power stations will have a life cycle that takes them well into this century, 
virtually all new capacity ought to be based on modern renewable energy. All power 
stations which are currently expected to be fuelled by coal, oil or gas would then have to 
be fuelled by wind energy, solar energy and/or modern biomass. Solar energy is not yet 
mature enough for broad application in the electricity generation sector. Wind energy 
currently costs between 1.5 and three times as much as energy generated in conventio-
nal power stations. The CO2 price of wind energy is between eUr	95 and eUr	240 per 
tonne of avoided CO2, depending among other things on what proportion of the costs of 
the conventional reserve capacity that must be maintained to accommodate unpredic-
tability in the supply of wind energy is attributed to wind energy. This also means that a 
maximum of around 20% of the electricity can be generated using wind power. Second-
generation biomass offers potential, but the existing infrastructure (the same also 
applies for solar and wind power) is insufficiently geared to new forms of sustainable 
energy. If the low cost-effectiveness is not enough to make this prohibitive in Europe, 
then this will certainly be the case on the global scale that is required.
Can renewable energy be combined with nuclear energy?
Is it feasible to achieve the target for the energy mix through a combination of modern 
renewable energy and nuclear power? As a theoretical exercise, it could be assumed 
that the share of modern renewable energy in global energy consumption will grow 
spectacularly in the coming decades to reach 20% in 2050 and that this growth will 
take place entirely at the expense of the share taken by fossil energy. Together with 
hydropower (2.2%) and traditional biomass (5.6%) this would result in a share of 28% 
for carbon-neutral energy excluding nuclear energy. In order to make the leap to the 
required 60% of carbon-neutral energy, the share taken by nuclear energy would thus 
have to grow from its present 6.7% to approximately 37% of a rapidly growing total, 
rather than falling to 4.6%. This is not an achievable figure. The authoritative mit 
study (2003) assumes in what it regards as an ambitious scenario for nuclear energy 
up to 2050 that there will be a tripling of the installed generation capacity to around 
1,000 gw. This would take the share of nuclear energy to around 10% of the primary 
energy in 2050, equivalent to an additional emission reduction of around 0.8 GtC 
compared with the present global energy mix.
A contribution from clean fossil energy
The use of fossil energy would not need to fall so much if it produced less CO2. The two 
main options for clean fossil energy are: 
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• Replacing coal with gas or other fuel  
If half the new coal-fired power stations forecast by the iea with a capacity of 1400 
gw were gas-fired, this would lead to a reduction of 0.5 GtC in 2054. This option 
has its limitations, however: gas reserves are finite, imported gas is generally more 
expensive than domestically extracted coal and the dependence on imports is poli-
tically unattractive. 
• Carbon capture and storage (CCS)  
The CO2 that is released unavoidably through the use of fossil energy is stored 
underground so that it no longer contributes to the greenhouse gas effect. CCs 
could enable an emission reduction to be achieved of approximately 1.2 GtC per 
year in 2030 and more than 2 GtC per year in 2050. 
Of these two options – which are in fact not mutually exclusive – CCs offers the grea-
test potential. The main reason for this is that CCs can be combined with gasification 
technology (see below) and, in that combination, can render the inevitable large-scale 
use of coal CO2-neutral. Use of CCs in combination with coal requires additional faci-
lities and costs more, but is nonetheless relatively cheap compared with many other 
emission reduction options. All parameters of the foregoing subsections are then met: 
coal, electricity and (in combination with the Clean Development Mechanism (Cdm) 
– see next chapter) developing countries.
Gasification technology is attractive for several reasons: it offers a new and efficient 
technology for the production of electricity, opens the way to the manufacture of new 
transport fuels (Ft-diesel or dimethyl ether, dme) and hydrogen (later this century), 
and allows large-scale use of all kinds of biomass (including wood-based) for the gene-
ration of electricity and biofuels. Since CCs is an ‘end-of-pipe’ solution, it is compa-
tible with the existing energy system. In combination with biomass, CCs can actually 
lead to the net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere. In combination with Enhanced 
Oil Recovery (Senior et al. 2004; Gielen and Podansky 2004; Ciab/IEA 2005), the oil 
extraction yield can be increased. 
4.4.3	 seParatIng	emIssIon	reductIon	and	energy	 	
transItIon
In the period up to 2040-2050 which is so crucial for climate policy, the dominance 
of fossil energy will be impossible to break; there is too little time to bring about a 
sufficient improvement in the position of modern renewable energy. Present policy is 
open to the risk that too much effort will be devoted to efficiency and modern rene-
wable energy, with the result that far too few results will have been achieved by 2050. 
This is all the more relevant because both routes are especially relevant for electricity 
generation and are therefore potentially each other’s competitors. High efficiencies for 
fossil-fuelled power stations are not good for the competitiveness of modern renewa-
emission reduction as a technical strategic issue 
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ble energy, and the replacement of gas by renewable energy is given little priority in 
any event. The anticipated high share of (cleaner) fossil-fuel power stations when new 
investments are made will greatly slow down the transition to carbon-neutral energy.
If the achievement of the 450 ppmv target is not to be made impossible in advance, it 
would be better to separate the goals of timely emission reduction and transition to a 
new energy system. Securing a substantial contribution by modern renewable energy 
to the envisaged emission reduction will demand large-scale use of this energy, and 
the costs of this young technology could quickly get out of hand. The technology is 
insufficiently mature to permit its widescale use at this time. A wiser course might be 
to distinguish between emission reduction programmes based on proven and cost-
effective technologies on the one hand and R&D programmes aimed at developing 
cost-effective technologies in the future on the other. Governments and businesses 
must gear their R&D programmes to the possibilities and to reducing costs in niche 
markets. In the us – unlike the	eU	– this distinction is already being made.
The transition to a carbon-neutral energy supply will require more patience. There is a 
need for an R&D strategy which promises to create the conditions for that transition in 
a later phase. Niche applications form part of this strategy. 
4.5	 route	3:	deforestatIon,	afforestatIon	and	
land-based	carbon	storage
The slow but steady fall in the rate of deforestation may be expected continue in a baU 
scenario. Experience has shown that when per capita incomes are rising, a moment 
comes in every country when people cease felling trees to make way for low-output 
agriculture. The growing demand for food to feed the rising world population is not a 
real barrier to reduced deforestation and more afforestation; the necessary increase 
in agricultural output can be achieved without using extra land, provided a steady 
global rise in yield per hectare of approximately 1.6-1.8% per year can be achieved. In 
virtually all IPCC scenarios it is accordingly assumed that the global forested area will 
increase again in 2100, offering opportunities for bio-energy. If the falling trend were 
to continue in a baU scenario, the annual loss of forested areas in 2050 would be half 
what it is now (Pacala and Socolow 2004a). The related emissions would then fall from 
their present 1.1 GtC per year to 0.5 GtC per year.
There are four ways of achieving emission reduction through natural carbon storage: 
less deforestation (0.5 GtC per year lower in 2050 than in a baU scenario), reforesta-
tion (1-1.5 GtC per year), promotion of timber as a construction material and changes 
in arable farming (0.5-1 GtC per year. This would make a total of 2-3 GtC per year 
achievable by 2050.
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Reducing the rate of deforestation can succeed only if it goes hand-in-hand with local 
and regional development, and can in turn reinforce that development through sustai-
nable forms of timber felling, preferably via plantations. In addition, timber could 
replace other carbon-intensive intensive raw materials as a construction material and 
biofuel, leading to synergy effects. It is however a finite route, because the net carbon 
uptake of fully grown trees is nil and the available area for planting is limited.
4.6	 route	4:	reducIng	emIssIons	of	oggs:	the	
examPle	of	methane
Methane is the most important of the other greenhouse gases (oggs), accounting for 
65% (1.8 GtC-equivalents). Laughing gas (N2O) comes a good second with 32% (0.9 
GtC-equivalents). Methane is particularly important because it has a marked warming 
effect and a short period of residence in the atmosphere. Measures targeting methane 
take effect relatively quickly, opening the way for risk reduction. Methane reduction is 
also important because, as with forestry, it allows developing countries to be involved 
in global climate policy (Reilly et al. 2004). Provided it is produced in a controlled 
way, methane can be used as a source of energy in local communities, both for heating 
and electricity. Finally, methane is important because, unlike fossil energy, there was 
no incentive in the past to use methane carefully. As a result there are a great many 
easy gains to be made at low cost or even with economic returns. 
Anthropogenic methane emissions are largely caused by leaking pipelines (half the 
total emissions come from the former Ussr), rotting waste, etc. Methane emissions 
could be cut by 20-40% at many sources at relatively low cost, primarily through the 
transfer of best practice technology and expertise, especially in relation to landfill and 
the processing of sewage sludge. Emissions from energy production and transport 
(gas, oil, coal) could be reduced by 80% using existing technology, and at least half this 
reduction could be brought about using measures which would be of financial benefit 
to industry. There are also positive side-effects in the form of improved safety due to 
reduced explosion hazard (mining), modernisation of production systems and energy 
yields from captured methane. 50-70% of the methane released in the coal industry 
could be captured. Combating deforestation (see section 4.5) would also counter the 
emission of methane caused by incomplete incineration of biomass (incineration of 
agricultural waste and wood for heating, cooking and charcoal production). All in all, 
it can be estimated that methane emissions could be cut cost-effectively to 35-45% of 
their present levels in the period to 2050, equivalent to a reduction of 1 GtC per year in 
2050 (see also Kets and Verweij 2005). 
Industrial oggs (especially N2O) lend themselves well to a global agreement, because 
the problem is relatively manageable: far fewer countries are involved than with CO2, 
because there are virtually no emissions of industrial oggs in developing countries 
emission reduction as a technical strategic issue 
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In order to meet the EU’s 2°C target, global CO2 emissions in 2050 would have to 
amount to only around 4 GtC per year. This would require a reduction of 10-11 GtC per 
year compared with a baU scenario. Table 4.4 shows that an effective emission reduc-
tion policy for the coming decades would have to be based on a combination of energy 
efficiency, CCs (in combination with coal and gas), bio-energy (eventually in combina-
tion with CCs), storage of CO2 in forests and soil through photosynthesis, a reduction 
in the emission of oggs (especially methane) and finally a residual group comprising 
mainly wind and nuclear power, but also solar power, geothermal energy and tidal 
energy. The quantities shown in the table will not be achieved spontaneously, but will 
require intensive policy. Although there is some reserve (around 10%) compared with 
the target up to the year 2050, it cannot be concluded from this that some options can 
be deleted in advance. Each of the routes has its own obstacles which stand in the way 




Intensification of energy efficiency policy 3.4 Efficiency
CCS 2.1 Energy mix
Bio-energy 1. Energy mix
Extra storage via photosynthesis 2.0 Forestry
Reduction of methane 1.0 OGG
Miscellaneous 1. Energy mix
Total 12.2 
Source: WRR
Given the global nature of the climate problem, Dutch and European climate policy 
must be based on global priorities. Solving the problem must be the central concern, 
not cleaning our own backyard. Cheap emission reduction options are available in 
developing economies, and (a great deal) more can therefore be achieved for every 
euro invested in those countries than here. Technology diffusion is important in the 
short term, while in the long term the development of new technology is key.
The rule of thumb applied in the Netherlands in the recent period, namely a 50-50 
distribution of measures taken domestically and measures in other countries, leads 
to unnecessary expensive measures which deliver little emission reduction per euro 
spent and result in an approach which, from a global perspective, is the second choice 
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without the envisaged innovation objectives being adequately achieved. The Council 
recommends that a structural distinction be made between the implementation of 
emission reduction measures and the transition to a new energy system. Implemen-
tation must take place now, using the available technology in those locations where 
this can be done cheaply. In particular, energy efficiency and the use of CCs in the 
burgeoning electricity sector in emerging economies are urgent. The transition to 
carbon-neutral energy requires more patience.







The climate is an indivisible public good at world level. The current leaders of the 
international coordination of mitigation – Japan and the European Union (EU) – are 
already unable to exert a decisive influence on annual net global emissions, regard-
less of their willingness to do so and regardless of the costs of doing so. In the longer 
term (up to 2050) these two leaders will have a steadily declining direct influence. The 
same applies for the member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (oeCd) as a whole. Effective climate policy can thus only succeed if it is 
a global policy. European and Dutch climate policy only make sense if they are embed-
ded in a global approach.
This chapter first describes the global coordination problem in more detail and explo-
res the conditions for effective coordination (section 5.2). Section 5.3 looks more 
closely at the starting points of global negotiations: structural and short-term interests 
and existing climate policy. Section 5.4 focuses on the institutional and substantive 




In chapter 1 the coordination problem was divided into three components: the deve-
lopment path of countries that are currently still poor, the distribution of costs and the 
allocation of efforts. The coordination problem is first and foremost concerned with 
mitigation, since this is where the need to eradicate ‘free rider’ behaviour is most urgent. 
Adaptation problems will mainly be solved regionally and only require international 
coordination where they go beyond the capacity of a single country or region. The deve-
lopment path of growth countries takes priority in climate issues. Roughly three-quar-
ters of the world population live in developing countries, half of them in countries with a 
relatively low per capita income. The primary ambition of these countries is to grow. 
The development problem demands solutions to the following global coordination 
issues: 
a. Which strategies and options can be developed to bring about a more rapid fall in 
energy intensity and carbon intensity in developing countries, without undermi-
ning their economic growth?
international coordination of climate policy
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b. How can developing countries be encouraged to pursue climate policy in those 
cases where the local ancillary benefits (co-benefits) of climate measures are inte-
resting? 
c. Is graduation, the (gradual, multistage) transition from ‘developing country’ to 
‘developed country’, a workable concept in international organisations, with the 
obligations and costs that it obviously entails? 
d. With or without an answer to question c: how can the present exemptions for (all) 
developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol be incorporated in agreements in the 
future in connection with the actual emission pathways or, even better, be defined 
as justifiable exceptions, which can therefore be of limited duration? 
e. How and to what extent can the costs of all these initiatives be reduced or shared 
through support from the OECD or otherwise (other organisations or institutions 
such as opec or the World Trade Organization (WTO), bilaterally or multilate-
rally)?
The distribution and allocation problem is no less tricky. Effective allocation via 
market instruments requires an initial distribution of the emission scope (and thus 
the emission rights). There are good political and economic reasons for allocating a 
disproportionately high initial distribution to developing countries, but there is no 
straightforward correspondence between such a distribution and the distribution of 
interests and negotiating positions. 
The allocation of mitigation must cost of the world as little as possible. Who pays for it 
is a different matter. Chapter 4 showed that rational allocation will lead to a great deal 
of mitigation in poor countries. The most cost-effective means of allocation demands 
maximum integration of emission reduction within the market mechanism. Where this 
is not feasible, or not for all participants in the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), supplementary allocation methods and instruments 
can be used. 
Technology development is an exception. There is both a push-effect (making money 
available for research) and a pull-effect (relative price changes give the market an 
incentive to carry out research) at work here. The push-mechanism risks both arbi-
trary competition with other government expenditure and erroneous selection of tech-
nologies. The risk of the pull-mechanism is mainly that it will above all foster the opti-
misation of existing technologies, which will therefore not lead to great leaps forward. 
The distribution issue is closely connected to the distribution of wealth throughout the 
world, but other factors are also relevant. The negotiation problem consists broadly of 
three elements, namely the distribution basis, the timing and instrumental flexibility:
• The distribution basis requires a set of interrelated indicators. The (convergence of 
the) net emissions per head of the population is an example of such an indicator. 
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• The timing of mitigation obligations is determined by the sequence in which miti-
gation options are deployed and by the extent to which countries gradually take on 
heavier commitments as their development progresses. 
• Instrumental flexibility gives countries maximum scope to achieve national and 
global cost-effectiveness. 
5.2.1	 comPlIcatIng	factors
There are three factors that complicate global coordination of climate policy: 
• There is great uncertainty regarding both the climate problem itself and regarding 
the costs of emission reduction policy and the outcome of the learning processes 
needed to develop the necessary innovation. This makes it difficult for participa-
ting countries to make an accurate assessment of their interests and makes it unat-
tractive for them to commit to far-reaching objectives, timeframes and strategy 
(McKibbin 2005). 
• A strong incentive to ‘free rider’ behaviour hampers coordination, because climate 
is a global public good. Even non-cooperative players stand to benefit from coope-
ration, however, for example in the form of no-regret options which cost little 
or nothing but which do reduce the collective problem of ‘free riders’. Coopera-
tive behaviour will not always be based on the interests of stakeholders in being 
cooperative. The widely used adage ‘the polluter pays’ is based in the first place on 
economic motives (i.e. the incentive to pollute less). The fact that this adage also 
contains a moral element bolsters the negotiating result, but does not form the 
basis for it. In negotiations without an authoritative arbiter it is often more likely 
to be the party suffering the damage that has to pay than the polluter. A coalition 
of a limited number of large players could make the ‘free rider’ problem manage-
able.
• The correlation between efficiency and distribution. Market forces require a 
distribution of emission rights. Zero-sum distribution issues are typically very 
difficult to achieve. This is the case in advance here because with climate policy the 
allocation requires that most efforts take place in developing countries, whereas 
the costs of those efforts must be borne to a disproportionate extent by developed 
countries. 
5.2.2	 condItIons	for	effectIve	coordInatIon
The literature devotes a good deal of attention to the conditions for effective coordi-
nation, chiefly with a view to constructing comprehensive international treaties in the 
aftermath of Kyoto. All manner of classifications and subcriteria create a great deal of 
diversity, but using a variant of Aldy et al. (2003), seven frequently recurring criteria 
can be distinguished, which show a mutual correlation and which in part are strongly 
mutually competitive 
international coordination of climate policy
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• Dynamic efficiency refers to an intertemporal global choice issue. The choice esta-
blishes the goals and concerns the distribution of resources between mitigation, 
adaptation, technology policy and other public and private expenditure. 
• Environmental effectiveness is concerned with efficacy. The policy must contribute 
to the achievement of the above goals, something that is less self-evident than it 
seems. 
• Cost-effectiveness requires that the goal is achieved with the minimum investment 
of resources. In the long term, cost-effectiveness also encompasses the intertem-
poral choice between innovation (new (breakthrough) technologies in oeCd coun-
tries) and diffusion (existing technologies in poorer countries).
• Fairness refers to a distribution of benefits and costs, responsibilities and support 
that is perceived as fair. Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC, which speaks of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ plays a large (perhaps too large) role here.
• Flexibility is needed in the light of the growing knowledge about the climate and 
the technological possibilities, but limits the stringency of long-term agreements 
and thus creates uncertainty about future obligations.
• Broad participation brings the policy choices closer to the global prosperity ideal 
and is also to some extent a condition for perceived fairness. Broad participation 
competes strongly with efficacy, because effective measures are expensive.
• Objective monitoring and enforcement are necessary in order to make efforts visi-
ble to the other parties, a necessary condition for coordinated efforts.
5.3	 the	PrIncIPal	Players:	Interests	and	PolIcy
The opportunities for effective negotiations are determined by the interests of the 
biggest players. The top six producers (Us, eU-25, China, Russia, Japan and India) 
account for more than two-thirds of the total CO2 emissions. In terms of land use, 
Indonesia and Brazil are also important producers of greenhouse gases (ghgs). It is 
in these eight countries/regions that the greatest reduction potential lies and, because 
the group contains the large economies, it is also where most of the likely damage will 
take place and where there is the greatest capacity for taking measures. In the medium 
term (up to 2030) these eight countries will determine the course of events. The 
interests will be largely determined by the energy structure of their economies, and 
the existing energy structures will exert a dominant influence on the climate policy 
pursued in the coming decades. Section 5.3.1 therefore looks at the diversity of energy 
structures in the world’s eight largest emitters of greenhouse gases. In addition, the 
individual interests and current climate policy of the United States (section 5.3.2), 
China (5.3.3) and Europe (5.3.4) are explored. 
5.3.1	 dIversIty	In	the	energy	structure	of	the	bIg	eIght
Table 5.1 brings together key figures for the above eight (groups of) countries for 2002 
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and 2030 based on the authoritative iea World Energy Outlook (2004). The iea 
calculated the energy-related annual CO2 emissions for 2030 in two ways: without 
additional climate policy (but with energy efficiency trends, etc.) (second column) and 
with specified additional climate policy (the Alternative Scenario) (third column). The 
percentages in column 3 represent the plausible reduction compared with the baU 
scenario. The key figures are supplemented with a few more specific focus areas which 
can explain in more detail where the sensitivities lie and where opportunities for coor-
dination occur. 
Table	5.1	 Key	indicators	for	the	interests	of	the	major	players
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Source: All data (calculated) from IEA, 2004, World Energy Outlook and Annexes. Notes: (a) 2002, 
energy-related CO2 emissions; (b) ditto, in IEA Alternative Scenario (analysis on pp. 387-397); N.B.: 
decline compared with standard scenario in previous column; (d) primary energy efficiency, improve-
ment per year up to 2030 (in %); (e) electrical imports = primary demand for energy, by energy 
sources, showing first the shares in 2002 and in the adjacent column the expected annual growth in 
% now up to 2030 with the exception of India; (f) North America = US, Mexico and Canada, because 
it is only in this combination that all data are comparable; (g) the decline here is for OECD Europe, 
which does not correspond exactly with the EU-25.
Focus	areas
- oil prices high (including petrol prices), good for coal (and nuclear?)
- net imports of total energy consumption double from 14% to 27%
- renewable energy (ex. hydro) from 4.3% to 6.7% (2030)
- switch back to coal weaker (than in US) because coal has (also) become more expensive, partly 
due to long transport distances
- renewable energy (ex. hydro) at most 9.7% in 2030
- extreme import dependency for oil (94% of demand in 2030) and gas (explosive increase from 
49% to 81%)
- extreme import dependency for oil, gas and coal
- nuclear energy increases from 15% to 18% (2030)
- renewable energy (ex hydro) only 4% in 2030, despite policy
6
international coordination of climate policy
The variation between the players is enormous. This at once provides the most impor-
tant lesson in exercises of this sort: it is important that the countries of the	eU	do not 
treat the interests and drivers of other countries and regions too lightly. The alterna-
tive scenarios with a fairly strict climate policy produce results. Evidently it is possible 
to pursue climate policy outside Kyoto, because according to the iea the reduction 
under the Alternative Scenario compared with a baU scenario is of the same order in 
the United States as in the	eU	and China. However, the bad news is that when every-
thing is taken together, even under the Alternative Scenario CO2 emissions continue to 
grow strongly up to 2030. 
In each of the Big Eight (with the exception of Brazil), a steady improvement in energy 
efficiency is a key driver of emission reduction. Many of these improvements are 
achieved by incorporating new technologies into new investments in power stations, 
industrial processes and transport. Diffusion and influencing investment flows (and 
their timing) should therefore occupy a central position in all climate policy. 
Nuclear energy is under pressure only in the	eU	and, to some extent, the US. Else-
where, nuclear energy is promoted to a greater or lesser extent (except in Indone-
- energy saving is top priority in the latest five-year plan
- import dependency for oil (from 28% in 1998 through 37% in 2003), to 74% in 2030
- financing ($2000 billion) of the increase in the supply of electrical not hampered by (high) 
domestic savings, but by other major obstacles
- coal dominates as input for electricity (trebling in TWh up to 2030), at 77% in 2002 and 72.4% 
in 2030; the question is whether that will not go even higher if oil/gas prices remain high
- lots of coal, but of poor quality
- biomass accelerates electrification in isolated areas
- for cars, biofuel and CNG are important and actively promoted
- local pollution very serious (opportunities for co-benefits?)
- hydro dominates (electricity supply) (80% in 2002); drought risk
- biomass significant for industry and transport (cars from 13% to 16% in 2030)
- low carbon intensity very favourable, but the gradual improvement in energy intensity is weak
- not dependent on oil/gas imports (if anything, improves up to 2030)
- climate policy to date strict, partly due to state monopolies and strict energy regulation; is 
becoming freer/open
- N.B..: if land-use CO2 is included, Brazil does have high immissions
- despite a strong desire in Russia to save (37%), it may not be possible to finance the required 
energy investments ($935 billion up to 2030)
- export shares of coal, gas, oil first increase, then decrease up to 2030
- carbon intensity a great concern: CO2 emissions per unit GDP more than double those in the 
OECD and developing countries; per capita emissions extremely high
- high priority (local and global) environmental policy, including for nuclear
- Kyoto and J.I. will to some extent force environmental policy
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sia). China, in particular, sees nuclear energy as a secondary resource (alongside the 
emphasis on coal) for achieving security of energy supply. Within the	eU	there is a 
wide diversity of views – and therefore of actions – on nuclear energy. Nuclear energy 
can and will make an important contribution to global mitigation in the next 30 years, 
with or without the Netherlands, but its share in the primary energy supply is unlikely 
even to remain at its present level globally, despite the building of new power stations. 
Demand for oil for transport has risen particularly strongly in China. High demand 
and limited production capacity are driving the price upwards, and this is (further) 
increasing the pressure to use coal for electricity generation. China has a coal-based 
economy which can consequently pose a threat to coordinated mitigation (unless 
carbon capture and storage (CCs) can be introduced at reasonable cost). Other coun-
tries such as the US, Canada, Ukraine, South Africa, India and Russia are coal-based 
economies to a greater extent than the eu: coal is cheap and plentiful there and is 
therefore more widely used. 
5.3.2	 the	PosItIon	of	the	unIted	states
Structural characteristics of the American economy 
Table 5.1 shows that the structure of the	Us	economy differs considerably from that 
of Europe. Half of all electricity generation is based on coal, of which there are suffi-
cient reserves to last at least two hundred years. The need for energy security and 
the prices of oil and gas make exploitation of those coal reserves almost inevitable. 
CCs is likely to be applied at best gradually, and only if it has little or no impact on 
America’s competitiveness. A fifth of America’s electricity is generated using nuclear 
power, but the number of nuclear power stations has not increased for almost 25 
years, partly because of the huge capital investments involved. The	Us	also has a car-
based economy with low fuel efficiency and little public transport. The transport sector 
consumes more energy than industry and is growing faster. Consumption will rise by 
1.3% per annum up to 2030. Energy security has a very high priority for the American 
superpower, but is currently under great pressure. According to the iea, America’s 
dependence on external energy will grow from 14% in 2002 to 27% in 2030. 
Current climate policy in the US
The American people are not indifferent to climate change and ghgs, but there is a 
cultural difference compared with Europe. There is also a clear difference between the 
federal and state level and between individual states. On the East and West Coast there 
are states which are pursuing a progressive climate policy and which even want to set 
up an emissions trading system. At federal level, policy is dictated by the unanimously 
adopted Bird/Hagel resolution (1997), in which the Senate declares its support for a 
mitigation policy that attaches two conditions to international obligations, namely “no 
substantial harm to the	Us	economy” and the notion that all UNFCCC countries (ulti-
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mately, but laid down in advance) must comply with mitigation obligations. Adapta-
tion to climate change is (rightly or wrongly) seen as a serious option in the US. 
The position of the Bush administration differs to only a limited degree from that of 
earlier governments. The Kyoto Protocol was formally rejected by President Bush in 
2002. In its place, American climate policy has three main tracks: 
• Mitigation based on an intensity objective: 18% emission reduction per unit GDP 
in the period 2002-2012. 
• Great faith in technological solutions and an extensive science and technology 
development programme. 
• International cooperation focused on (clean) economic growth and technology 
development. 
5.3.3	 the	PosItIon	of	chIna
Structural characteristics of the Chinese economy 
China is in the process of passing the eU-25 in the ranking of (absolute) CO2 pollu-
ters, making it the world’s biggest polluter after the United States. China’s share in 
global CO2 emissions is set to grow from 14% in 2002 to 19% (of a much greater total) 
in 2030. Primary energy consumption in 2002 was accounted for by coal (57%), 
oil (20%) and biomass (17%). Chinese biomass is almost exclusively the product of 
underdevelopment. Coal will continue to dominate, especially in electricity genera-
tion, because China has extensive reserves and coal is cheap. The country’s economic 
structure differs markedly from that of the	eU	and the US. In 1998, industry produced 
75% of China’s CO2 emissions and transport only 9%. Industry will remain the most 
important sector for the time being, though (car) transport is expected to increase 
explosively. In view of the great concerns about the rapidly increasing dependence on 
imported energy, China is looking to diversify its energy supply. In order of growth 
rate (from a small base), this means nuclear energy (9.2% per annum), natural gas 
(5.4% per annum) and major hydropower projects (3.4% per annum). 
Current climate policy in China
China has ratified the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, but neither imposes any quanti-
tative obligations on China. This does not however mean that there is no climate policy. 
Energy efficiency is improving rapidly by 1.5% per year, as a result of all manner of 
direct and indirect policy. China’s priority is on economic growth and external energy 
supply security. However, the country has been found willing to invest heavily in no-
regret policy of all kinds in line with these priorities. In addition, central government is 
trying to introduce the principle of ‘the polluter pays’ to combat the major local environ-
mental problems, in the face of resistance from local interests and widespread corrup-
tion. Fuel standards have been introduced in the transport sector, which in terms of 




This section is concerned with the strategic position of the EU. The actual climate 
policy pursued by the	eU	was outlined earlier, in chapter 2. The	eU	has assumed 
the role of leader; in 1996, a year before the Kyoto Protocol, the European Council of 
government leaders adopted the 2°C target., reaffirming it in March 2005. This self-
declared leadership has been repeatedly tested as other major players have pulled out 
(most notably the	Us	in Kyoto) or failed to pull their weight completely (e.g. not one 
single firm obligation under the Kyoto Protocol for developing countries, including 
China and India, but also for less poor ‘developing countries’). During the 2001 Euro-
pean Council in Gothenburg, the definitive American rejection of the Kyoto Protocol 
(shortly before the Council) was met with a solid enforcement of the policy, rooted 
explicitly in the credibility of the European leadership. Table 5.2 summarises the main 
strategic principles which determine current	eU	climate policy. 
The eu’s emissions trading system is a thoroughly worked out apparatus which serves 
as an example to the world. In terms of CO2 mitigation, however, it remains a modest 
finger exercise for the moment. Partly because of this, the anticipated CO2 price will 
not be high enough to provide an impetus for new technology, but will be high enough 
to force short-term improvements in energy efficiency, etc. 
Table	5.2	 Strategic	principles	of	European	climate	policy
General – Multilateral and EU leadership (Council resolution 2001)
– Sustainability context (Council resolution 2001; ec Treaty)
– Relatively decentralised (shared competence of EU and member states)
Mitigation 
targets
 – Long-term global objective: less than 2 °C rise in average temperatures 
compared with pre-industrial levels
– Target for 2012: % ghg reduction compared with 10  
(as per Kyoto Protocol 1)
– Kyoto targets vary per member state, due to internal cost-sharing (1), 
differences in marginal mitigation costs and differences in living standards
– T arget for 2020: 1-30% reduction compared with 10; cost-benefit 
analyses (Council resolution 200)
Costs – Up to 2012 only measures below EUR 20 per tonne of avoided CO2  
(as per European climate strategy 2001, ECCP)
– Sometimes deliberately higher costs, based on ‘promoting transition’ 
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Section 5.4.1 draws lessons from a comparison between the climate problem and the 
ozone problem. Section 5.4.2 indicates how these lessons can be used as input to build 
on the UNFCCC. As the climate problem cannot be solved by an emissions ceiling 
alone, a ‘multicoloured flexibility’ is needed (section 5.4.3), in which international 
climate initiatives can be made visible and coordinated, as well as an improvement in 
the institutional dimension (section 5.4.4). The flipside of multicoloured flexibility is 
an absence of obligation. Coalition formation, and leadership of and within coalitions 
(section 5.4.5) are needed to increase the sense of obligation. 
5.4.1	 montreal	versus	Kyoto
The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (1988) has been 
a success. There are clear differences and correspondences compared with the climate 
problem. 
Cost-benefit analyses
Both the ozone problem and the CO2 problem are global atmospheric problems which 
cause damage and require coordinated mitigation efforts. However, the cost-benefit 
analyses for ozone and for CO2 are very different, both in terms of magnitude and 
timeframe. With the ozone problem, the oeCd member states were able to achieve 
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sizeable net benefits from mitigation at individual country level in the relatively short 
term, without this requiring short-term efforts from non-oeCd countries. The bene-
fits of CO2 mitigation are much less clear-cut than with ozone and can be achieved 
only in the very long term. Major net benefits at individual country level are unlikely, 
because ghg emissions are diffused much more widely than emissions of gas propel-
lants. It is clear that, without the commitment of developing countries, at some point 
in the future the mitigation benefits will be too small in relation to the costs to moti-
vate oeCd countries to take action. There is thus no unilateral option for oeCd coun-
tries, as there was for ozone. 
Architecture of the Protocol
There are five elements of the architecture of the Montreal Protocol which bolstered its 
efficacy: 
• Global participations. From the first variant of the Montreal Protocol, emission 
ceilings were compulsory for all participants. This was also possible (in contrast 
to the Kyoto Protocol) because the timeframe was more compact and financial 
compensation for developing countries remained affordable.
• Compensation for the incremental costs for poor countries. This is at least a hund-
red times more expensive with the climate problem than with the ozone problem. 
Moreover, the costs of this compensation are rising strongly as a result of the anti-
cipated economic growth of developing countries.
• Time consistency for investments. The credibility of the emission ceilings under 
the Montreal Protocol was great enough to enable long-term investments to be 
based upon it. By contrast, the validity of the Kyoto Protocol is limited (up to 
2012), with uncertainty as to what will happen thereafter. 
• Trade sanctions. The Montreal Protocol incorporated credible trade sanctions 
against non-signatories with regard to specific substances and products. CO2 is 
much less specific.
• Compulsion. The Montreal Protocol was reinforced in 1992 by a ‘carrot and stick’ 
approach. The Kyoto Protocol has only limited instruments to enforce compliance. 
5.4.2	 buIldIng	on	the	UNFCCC
Goal and principles
Almost 190 countries have signed up to the UNFCCC, an indication that the main 
objective and principles enjoy virtually universal support. The ultimate objective is 
to prevent human activity from damaging the climate and to slow down the rate of 
change sufficiently to enable ecosystems to adapt. More operational principles can be 
based on the tenet of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, such as ‘the polluter 
pays’ and differentiation by ability to mitigate and to take account of special vulnera-
bilities (e.g. in poor countries). The focus on the future (‘for the benefit of present and 
future generations’) can give rise to principles of environmental efficacy and efficiency, 
international coordination of climate policy
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as well as a recognition that economic growth in poor countries is a legitimate priority. 
The precautionary principle rules out the interpreting of uncertainty as a compelling 
reason not to pursue policy. The gatt compatibility prevents climate policy being 
misused as a means of erecting arbitrary trade barriers.
Obligations
Mitigation obligations apply under the Kyoto Protocol only for the Annex 1 countries. 
There is no timeframe or mechanism for future obligations. Also, there are no sanc-
tions for failure to comply with most of the obligations arising either from the Kyoto 
Protocol or the UNFCCC. Reporting requirements are however included which could 
lead to exchange, consolidation and possibly open debate on each other’s climate 
policy. The reports are intended to lead to an external evaluation of the policy pursued. 
So far, evaluation (among other things under Article 4.2) or enforcement have failed 
due to an impasse between Annex 1 countries and other countries. Combined with the 
weak reporting requirements, this is currently the Achilles heel of the UNFCCC. Weak 
obligations to some extent fit in with the weak mechanism for dispute settlement 
incorporated in the UNFCCC. The combination of these two could be interpreted as a 
sign of a wide gap between principles and effective obligations. 
Organisation of the negotiations
The organs of the international coordination of climate policy are partly formal and 
partly informal. Figure 5.1 shows the most important bodies in both guises. The 
UNFCCC is not a standing organisation; progress is managed by the Conference of the 
Parties (CoP) which meets once or twice a year and in which all countries participate. 
The meetings of the CoP are fairly unproductive for three reasons: they are too big; 
the cop largely has the function of a forum which is used for conveying messages rela-
ting to domestic politics; and the un model used, which gives everyone a vote on every-
thing, means that the CoP lacks any real structure. 
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Figure	5.1	 Climate	negotiations:	structure	and	groupings
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Thinking outside Kyoto without abandoning Kyoto
The post-Kyoto negotiations in the Meeting of the Parties (moP) offer more promise 
than the CoP, given the legal obligations and the precision of the Protocol. The effec-
tiveness of the COP could be improved if cooperation incentives were built into the 
organisation based on mutual interests and aimed at encouraging problem-ownership 
by the parties. The key will be effectively negotiating adequate obligations of all kinds 
over a longer timeframe within the framework of the UNFCCC, and then actually 
enforcing those obligations. ‘Multicoloured flexibility’ (section 5.4.3) will be an essen-
tial part of this, but there is also an institutional dimension which requires improve-
ment (section 5.4.4).
5.4.3	 multIcoloured	flexIbIlIty
Coordination means that parties take on related obligations. Figure 5.2 shows that a 
wider diversity of policy commitments is possible. The left half of the figure sums up 
three main choices, which are separate from the nature and content of the commit-






In the first place, coordination can be effected both via governments and via the 
market. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive, but complement each other. 
Based on the common framework, the UNFCCC, different alliances may arise in a 
variable Asia Pacific Partnership of the Us, India and China. In addition, market play-
ers are able and often willing to agree on standards at sectoral level. Market forces do 
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not always have to be driven by the government. Trade sanctions can under certain 
conditions supplement international environmental treaties. Experience has shown 
that the trade context can be successfully used via the mechanism of issue linking. For 
example, Russia owes the support it received from the	eU	for its wto membership 
partly to the fact that it signed up to the Kyoto Protocol. Long-term timeframes are 
important because of the long-term nature of the problem and a certain optimisation 
of the mitigation strategy, but cannot always be negotiated in advance. Without atten-
tion for monitoring and enforcement, finally, coordination cannot be achieved. 
Nature and content of the obligations
Multilateral treaties need not, or not exclusively, be about absolute reduction targets. 
In such a framework, a second Kyoto Protocol could form part of a much broader web 
of protocols or commitments. The distribution of the costs and the location where 
cost-effective mitigation takes place need not coincide. In addition, when it comes to 
the nature of the obligations there is no objection to more or less freely chosen menus 
of mitigation methods at UNFCCC level. 
Figure 5.2 distinguishes seven categories of obligations. Absolute, quantitative targets 
such as those set out in the Kyoto Protocol have pertinent advantages, such as clarity 
about the result and the possibility of achieving cost-effectiveness through emissions 
trading. It may also be possible to link an international carbon market to businesses 
in countries (such as the Us) which have not entered into any absolute commitments 
(see Egenhofer 2005, in CePs 2005). Absolute targets are made more acceptable if 
a safety valve is built in in the form of a maximum carbon price. Intensity targets are 
aimed at reducing carbon use per unit gdP (decarbonisation) or energy consumption 
(‘decoupling’). gdP growth can partly or fully cancel out the reduction in emissions; 
this is the case in China and the us. Sectoral targets are appropriate for involving the 
private sector. Positive incentives which rule out loss (no-lose options) are suitable for 
bringing in poor countries. Gradual harmonisation of national policy in the form of 
policies and measures (Pams) also offers a low-threshold option. Financial and non-
financial transfers are also possible which could operate bilaterally, via technology 
treaties or via a world climate fund.
The third perspective is that of the hardness of the obligations. The UNFCCC recog-
nises the priority that developing countries attach to economic growth. It is therefore 
important to create some clarity on the question of when a developing country under-
goes the transition to a modern industrialised nation. Multistage approaches try to 
objectify these transitions, but our definition of criteria for graduation has so far not 
worked in the gatt. 
The fourth perspective, finally, relates to the distribution of costs. The principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ can be operationalised in many different ways. 

5.4.4	 InstItutIonalIsatIon	of	global	coordInatIon
It can be seen from figure 5.1 on the structure of the present climate negotiations 
and the operation of the UNFCCC that there is in reality virtually no structure. The 
configuration is geared almost entirely to negotiations in the COP, albeit with techni-
cal support from bodies such as the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA), the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and expert groups, in 
addition to an active secretariat (though which has no competences and cannot take 
its own initiatives). There is no permanent organisation that is concerned at all levels 
with implementation, supervision, feedback, studies and options and thorough prepa-
ration of negotiations in the COP. 
A limited, specific institutionalisation of the global coordination of climate policy 
could lead to noticeable improvements. This should not be seen as a ‘miracle cure’; the 
conflicts of interest will remain in a more institutionalised setting and it will be neces-
sary to negotiate at all kinds of levels on financial transfers, often painful adaptations 
or policy changes. The priority given to the substantive aspects discussed above will 
also have to continue, because institutionalisation alone is not a panacea.
The UNFCCC signatories could establish a World Climate Organisation (wCo), with 
a supreme ministerial council (WCO Council) carrying out final negotiations. The 
permanent organisation of the WCO would need to comprise a secretariat and a formal 
committee of permanent ambassadors to the WCO, answering to a Special Climate 
Council (SCC), which would offer permanent seats to the largest seven or eight pollu-
ters as referred to earlier and with rotating country members and a rotating presi-
dency, with for example 15 SCC members in total. Although all kinds of informal coali-
tions could be formed for negotiations, responsibility for the direction and efficacy of 
the WCO would be clearly in the hands of the SCC. There would be a recognition of 
ownership, as it were. The permanent scc would offer every opportunity for coalition 
formation and initiatives to flourish in mutual interest. Moreover, the permanence of 
the missions in the secretariat would offer a much better guarantee of the ever more 
intensive administrative and technical implementation, monitoring, linking with 
current research and other issues. 
5.4.5	 coalItIon	formatIon	and	leadershIP
Effective coordination is based on a common interest and on mutual benefit from the 
efforts of the negotiating partners. For negotiating partners with major interests, the 
value of their input is much greater than the transaction costs of their participation in 
the negotiations. Small coalitions with large interests can achieve common aggregated 
preferences for participants with minimal transaction costs. Interests are determined 
above all by the extent to which damage is suffered, the size of the potential emission 
international coordination of climate policy
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reduction and the weight of the participants’ own policy discretion. As coalitions must 
be stable in order to function credibly, they cannot be too large. Game theory teaches 
us that large groups of more or less similar countries have difficulty in achieving large, 
stable coalitions. Nonetheless, it is almost unimaginable that every continent will not 
have at least one country in such a coalition of the greats. A strong coalition can also 
exercise political power through its size and therefore limit the free rider behaviour 
of outsiders. It is therefore of cardinal importance that, even if this collective can be 
institutionalised in the SCC of a new WCO, the members of the collective see that they 
have a direct interest in cooperation within this small group. Ownership is essential. 
Leadership is also possible and desirable within coalitions. If the differences in size 
and importance are extreme, that the leadership may be exercised by a single country 
or a close-knit group of countries (such as the eu). The leader indicates the urgency 
and the direction. This entails costs. In order to make its leadership credible, it is 
essential that the	eU	achieves its Kyoto obligations. The question of whether those 
obligations actually constitute effective climate policy in the light of the objective is 





An effective and efficient climate policy demands an unusual combination of realism 
and ambition: the realism starts from the existing situation, but is unable to break 
away from it sufficiently; the ambition focuses on what is needed, but without realism 
will turn out to be nothing more than building castles in the air.
There has been no lack of ambition in the past decade. The European Union (EU) has 
taken the lead by formulating its 2°C target. Achieving this target means that, accor-
ding to current insights, net global emissions of greenhouse gases (ghgs) must be so 
low by around 2050 that the stock of ghgs in the atmosphere stabilises at around 550 
ppmv CO2 equivalents by the end of the century. This report shows that it is in prin-
ciple possible to opt for global emission reduction routes which realise the required 
ambition. That is the good news. 
However, the 2°C target is also an exceptionally demanding one. An assessment of 
which global strategy can actually be realised requires a sober assessment of the inte-
rests and policy priorities of all countries, and above all of a limited number of large 
polluters with different preferences from the eu, and certainly from the Netherlands. 
In the Council’s view, the combination of high ambition and low realism could very 
easily drive up the costs without underpinning the global efficacy – and that is the only 
thing that matters for the climate. Simply waiting without ambition until other coun-
tries demonstrate leadership is neither in Dutch long-term interests nor in line with 
the evident preferences of the Dutch population. 
The Council is concerned about both the efficacy and efficiency of Dutch climate 
policy. If we look at climate policy in the light of all manner of other important social 
objectives (such as health care, education, reducing world poverty and securing energy 
supplies), the situation becomes more complex. It then becomes necessary to make 
choices between, say, investing a euro now or in ten years’ time in education in poor 
countries or spending that same euro on climate policy. These are difficult judgments 
to make given the great uncertainties. And the precautionary principle cannot replace 
those judgments. In other words, it would smack of tunnel vision if the ambitions and 
efforts in relation to climate policy were not placed in this broad social context. 
Climate policy can only be effective if it is embedded in a global strategy for the long 
term. If European and Dutch policy is geared only to their own preferences, own 
timeframes and own interests, it will be ineffective and will simply drive up the costs. 
a dutch and european climate strategy
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Moreover, climate policy is not synonymous with emission reduction; it involves a 
combination of adaptation, emission reduction and global coordination, and their 
mutual interrelationship over the longer term. 
In this final chapter the Council sets out a climate strategy in which priority is given 
to efficacy and efficiency. No guarantees can be given, because so many players help 
determine the result over a very long period, because further technological progress 
will be required and because there are still great uncertainties regarding the climate. 
However, the following mandatory requirements can be identified as a minimum: 
• The strategy must be global. Europe and Japan do not determine either global 
emissions or the global political agenda.
• There is a time horizon spanning several generations.
• Strategic insight is needed into the choices and priorities (in the light of costs and 
benefits) over that long period – and for the world as a whole, not just for the 
Netherlands or the eU.
• There is a need to be open to the preferences and interests of other major players. 
These criteria for efficacy and efficiency set the framework for the central question 
addressed by this wrr report: How can the Netherlands, as a member of the Euro-
pean Union, pursue an effective climate policy from a global and strategic perspec-
tive? The three policy tracks needed for the most effective possible climate strategy are 
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6.2	 hIgh	PrIorIty	for	adaPtatIon
Reasons for high priority
Adapting to a changing climate in the Netherlands is of great importance for four 
reasons:
• Even if a global emission reduction policy is successful, the climate will change in 
the next century. 
• The credibility of a coordinated global emission reduction is currently low. Robust 
policy must explicitly take this into account, without becoming a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.
• Excessive vulnerability will undermine the negotiating position of Europe.
• The Netherlands has fallen behind in recent decades in securing cost-effective 
flood protection because the Delta standards have not been updated. This effect is 
greater than the anticipated effects of climate change, at least during the present 
century.
a dutch and european climate strategy
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The Council believes that in the climate strategy to date it has been too easily assumed 
that there is a lack of adaptive capacity, or that adaptation should be a second choice, 
because emission reduction will not (any longer) be enough to avoid climate change. 
Adaptation: a realistic option
Adaptation policy cannot replace an internationally coordinated emission reduction 
strategy, but – at least for the Netherlands and for the next hundred years – is consi-
derably simpler. Adaptation, where it is possible and provided it is not too expensive 
or disruptive, is locally attractive because the fruits of local efforts are enjoyed locally, 
whereas with emission reduction this is much less the case. Adaptation cannot be seen 
as an exclusively local process in all cases. The world community can strengthen the 
adaptive capacity of poor countries and will sooner or later have to accept vulnerabili-
ties which are existential or disruptive for whole regions or peoples. 
For the Netherlands, water management is crucial and needs to be given high priority 
in relation to flood safety. In addition, attention for natural assets and ecology is called 
for. Climate change not only brings threats for rural areas; it also brings opportunities, 
and some of those opportunities can be created in the wake of the measures to be taken. 
Recommendation	1
The Council recommends that high priority be given to adaptation in a broad 
sense to a changing climate in the Netherlands. Adaptation is not an admis-
sion of defeat but is an effective form of problem-solving. 
The key is keeping open opportunities
Measures to improve flood safety demand major investments and are long-term in 
nature. A phased approach can however be adopted for these investments. On the 
other hand, it is virtually impossible, or at least extremely expensive, to adopt a phased 
approach to setting aside areas for the flood safety policy. Unbridled urbanisation in 
areas which might be needed in the future for water management purposes could exact 
a heavy price later. The consequences of climate change for water management are 
anything but certain. It is not certain that areas set aside now will ever be used. Desig-
nating a dual purpose for these areas is therefore an obvious step. Setting aside areas 
for wet landscape functions could go hand-in-hand with designation for green usage 
(nature). However, such designation virtually rules out ‘red’ (construction) functions. 
Measures to limit the risk of flooding required public support. Time and again measu-
res that appear desirable at national level meet with resistance at local level which 
ultimately leads to a change in course in the national policy. Giving a higher priority 
to water management demands a stronger stance by national government which over-
rides the position of lower administrative layers. 
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Recommendation	2
Areas of landscape must be set aside without delay for future water manage-
ment. This means giving overriding importance to national over local prio-
rities, as well as the necessary administrative changes to facilitate this. Since 
it is not certain that areas set aside in this way will actually be used, desig-
nating dual usage for water and nature, whilst ruling out construction, is a 
logical move. Major investments in flood safety can be made affordable by a 
phased approach over an extended period. Water management also requires 
international coordination in the major river basins. 
6.3	 emIssIon	reductIon:	routes	and	tImeframes
Challenge: drastic reduction in carbon emissions by 2050
The atmospheric concentration of ghgs that can be achieved by 2100 will be largely 
determined by the emissions in the next fifty years. This means that there is too little 
time to wait for a transition in the energy system if the	eU’s 2°C target is to be realis-
tically achievable. It is a formidable challenge to ensure that net emissions reduce 
sufficiently over the next five decades, especially against the background of a growing 
world population and strong economic growth in developing countries. Growth has 
priority in these countries, and especially in those countries where the gulf compared 
with the wealthy nations is wider. This means that in the coming decades it is not 
only the wealthy countries but also the relatively poor countries which will increasin-
gly have to reduce the carbon-intensity of their production. The emission reduction 
process is unlikely to have been completed after the next fifty years. It is therefore 
important to invest sufficiently in research and development (r&d) and in niche 
applications in order to develop groundbreaking emission reduction options for the 
period after 2035-2050. 
The Council identifies four main routes for a global emission reduction policy over the 
coming decades: (1) improved efficiency in primary energy consumption; (2) changing 
the energy mix (fossil energy, nuclear energy, modern renewable energy, etc.); (3) 
use of sinks that absorb CO2; and (4) attention for other greenhouse gases (oggs). 
A process of technology development and diffusion is needed to allow successful 
progression along these main routes.
Renewable energy offers too little potential up to 2030 
Improved energy efficiency is the basis of emission reduction policy, but is not enough 
on its own, so that modification of the energy mix is also needed. Even an optimistic 
scenario in which, alongside economic growth and efficiency improvements in a baU 
scenario, allowance is made for an additional policy-driven reduction in energy inten-
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sity, results in a growth in emissions of 0.7% per year, whereas a reduction of 0.8% 
per year is needed in order to achieve the	eU	2°C target. This means that, in order to 
achieve the	eU	target, an extra emission reduction of around 1.5% per year is needed 
relative to this optimistic scenario.
There are two options for achieving a far-reaching reduction in fossil CO2: global 
alternatives to fossil energy or cleaner fossil energy. The alternatives to fossil energy 
are: (1) nuclear energy, which currently accounts for 7% of global primary energy 
consumption, falling to 5% in 2030; (2) renewable energy, with a current share of 
13%. However, more than half the renewable energy comes from traditional biomass. 
If renewable energy were to be made an important element in the climate strategy, a 
contribution would have to come from solar energy, wind power and modern biomass. 
Bearing in mind the fall in the shares of nuclear energy and traditional biomass, their 
current total share of 4% of primary energy consumption would then have to grow to 
around 34-46% of what by then will be a much increased primary energy consump-
tion. Chapter 4 shows that this cannot be a realistic strategy. 
As the use of coal is unavoidable in the short term, adequate global mitigation requires 
that gasification technology be widely used for electricity generation, something which 
will put (further) pressure on the competitiveness of solar energy and wind power. 
The choice for coal is then simultaneously a choice for the long-term postponement 
of the use of solar and wind power, except in niche markets. Modern biomass is much 
more compatible with coal use, and is moreover currently the only realistic low-carbon 
alternative suitable for use in the transport sector. This means that biomass is for the 
moment a much more promising option than solar energy and wind power.
In the view of the Council, present policy is focused too much on the use of modern 
renewable energy within the Netherlands and the	eU	in the short term, by means of 
grants and portfolio targets. On the other hand, there are signs of a change of tack, as 
the open-ended character of some grants is being abandoned.
Recommendation	3
The Council recommends a realistic approach to the use of modern renewable 
energy. The enormous investments on a worldwide scale and the requirement 
of cost-effectiveness that many countries will set as a condition, imply that 
the global carbon price will have to be high for a long time before renewable 
energy brings down emissions very sharply with present technology. For this 
reason, the Council recommends cautious use of minimum portfolio obligati-
ons in the energy supply.
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The Council also concludes that, in the coming decades at least, nuclear energy will 
form an indispensable part of the world energy supply, both because of the increasing 
importance being attached internationally to security of energy supplies and because of 
the required emission reductions. Nuclear energy is safer and more efficient than twenty 
years ago, though four key problems remain: the waste problem, the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and nuclear power stations as a potential supplier or victim of terro-
rism, their public acceptance and the enormous initial investments required. The limited 
share taken by nuclear energy in the global energy mix will increase – slightly – only as 
a result of very major investments, because energy consumption is set to increase explo-
sively at the same time. The choice to be made in the Netherlands is primarily a political 
one, and will in reality make little difference at international level. In the view of the 
Council, however, the Netherlands should seek to ensure that the taboo which applies 
for nuclear energy is not sustained in a post-Kyoto arrangement (as is now the case for 
Clean Development Mechanism projects, Cdm and Joint Implementation projects, Ji). 
Recommendation	4
The Netherlands must use its influence to ensure that a post-Kyoto arrange-
ment leaves open the option to support new generations of nuclear energy 
via CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) and JI (Joint Implementation). 
Nuclear energy can and will contribute for much of this century (and possibly 
the entire century) to emission reduction and security of energy supplies at 
global level. The Netherlands needs to review its own nuclear options more 
in terms of greater security of energy supplies in the long term than in terms 
of the climate, because the influence of Dutch nuclear energy policy on global 
emission reductions will be minimal. 
Energy efficiency and clean fossil energy are urgently needed
In many countries, the temptation to base electricity generation on coal, with its high 
emission levels, is irresistible: coal is cheap, stocks are enormous, the energy supply 
security it gives to the country concerned is an additional bonus and power stations 
are geared to coal. On the downside, coal contains much more carbon per unit of 
energy and therefore exacerbates the emission problem. In a dozen coal-based econo-
mies such as the US, China, India, Australia, Russia, Indonesia, South Africa and the 
Ukraine, the emission reduction policy is therefore above all a policy focused on clean 
fossil energy. Unless emissions from coal use are tackled radically across the world, 
every climate strategy is doomed to failure.
Energy efficiency can be pursued primarily in the end use and generation of electri-
city. A major sea change can and must be effected in inefficient and rapidly growing 
economies. In the electricity sector, major investments will have to be made in this in 
the near future which will establish the energy structure for a long period, so that there 
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is great potential here combined with a closing window of opportunity. 
Cleaner fossil energy, especially through CO2 capture and storage, is crucial in a dozen 
medium-sized and large coal based economies which house roughly two-thirds of the 
world population. Carbon capture and storage (CCs) is the only emission reduction 
option in the energy mix which is of interest in these countries during the next five 
decades. Gasification technology, in addition to local environmental benefits, offers 
the option of applying CCs at a later stage (first in the oeCd countries or, experimen-
tally, in poor countries and then on a wider scale). Precisely where coal is used, CCs 
can bring about an extra-large reduction effect. Moreover, gasification technology 
opens the way for a sharp increase in the use of biomass, with electricity or clean 
transport fuels as the end products. 
Recommendation	5
The Dutch climate strategy needs to focus more on energy efficiency – at 
home, in Europe and worldwide – and on the international application of 
gasification technology and carbon capture and storage. 
More attention for sinks
An increase of just 2% in the absorption capacity of land-based sinks will result in the 
withdrawal of 1.2 GtC from the atmosphere each year. This will relieve the pressure on 
investments in clean fossil energy and in expensive modern renewable energy, especi-
ally in the coming decades. More attention for sinks will help create the time needed 
for the gradual replacement of old electricity power stations, for large-scale research 
and development into carbon-free technologies and for a much more gradual adapta-
tion. This route means halting deforestation, accelerating afforestation and reforesta-
tion, greater use of timber in products and buildings, and finally limiting ploughing to 
where this is needed for planting. 
More global attention for OGGS
In the short term, in particular, it is cost-effective to focus attention on methane and 
(industrial) N2O. Until the Kyoto Protocol there was no pricing or policy incentive to 
focus on oggs, and there is consequently a great deal of unrealised potential. More-
over, methane reduction is attractive from the perspective of timing because of its 
shorter period of residence in the atmosphere. The main industrial oggs to be redu-
ced are fluorohydrocarbons and chlorohydrocarbons. The conditions that apply here 
somewhat resemble those in the Montreal Protocol (ozone protection). 
Technology development and diffusion
Cheap emission reduction options are available mainly in developing countries in the 
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coming decades. Technology diffusion is necessary in order to realise these options. 
Research and development are also needed to develop genuinely new technologies. 
However, the Council feels that a clear distinction should be drawn between innova-
tion and implementation. Forced implementation of immature technologies entails 
high costs which do not justify the small incremental improvements brought about 
by such a policy. In the period up to around 2030 the market incentives for radical 
change will remain relatively small owing to the cheap reduction options in poor 
countries. Precisely because R&D is so important, the Council distances itself from the 
50-50 policy: this policy is neither efficient in bringing about emission reduction, nor 
effective in engendering R&D. 
The R&D and innovation route pursued by the Netherlands and the EU, which promo-
tes transitions to emission-free technology and transport, needs to be and remain 
sufficiently ambitious for many decades, and needs to focus on radical new technolo-
gies. These efforts by the Netherlands and the	eU	must be further internationalised, 
as a minimum in strategic alliances with the US, Canada and Japan. Within the EU, 
the Sixth Framework Research and Development Programme offers every opportunity 
for this, while the decision-making process on the Seventh Framework Programme is 
already at an advanced stage. 
Recommendation	6
The Council recommends that a clear distinction be made between innovation 
and implementation. Innovation must be encouraged mainly via r&D and can 
be achieved to only a limited extent via implementation grants. The 50-50 
policy is neither efficient nor effective. The Dutch transition strategy to emis-
sion-free technologies must be embedded in a global climate strategy (and not 
a purely Dutch strategy) and must be related to the globally dominant prio-
rities (such as clean fossil energy). This implies different priorities from those 
geared only to Dutch preferences.
6.4	 the	effIcacy	of	global	coordInatIon
Rich countries (help) pay for emission reductions in poor countries
The coordination issue relates to who will do what, how intensively and when, or who 
will pay for this. In the coming decades the biggest task will be to ensure that indu-
strialising and poor countries achieve their economic growth in an emission-efficient 
way. The marginal costs of emission reduction will remain low in these countries for 
many decades. A rational allocation of resources thus demands a high concentration of 
emission reduction efforts in developing countries. This will only happen if the oeCd 
countries ensure the diffusion and further development of the necessary technology 
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and pay for all or part of its application. The distribution issue is then concerned with 
the transfers or other forms of direct or indirect payments to poor countries. To a very 
limited extent this already happens under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and, in the Kyoto Protocol, via the Cdm, under which 
the rich countries meet their emission reduction obligations through emission reducti-
ons in poor countries which have no such obligations. 
The Netherlands must link its climate policy to development work. Cdm projects 
arranged under a less bureaucratic and better equipped regime than at present are an 
obvious means of achieving this. Given that the global emission reduction routes, we 
can indicate three core focuses for Cdm example projects:
• incorporating gasification technology and CCs technology, or enabling these to be 
incorporated, especially in new power stations;
• curbing deforestation and encouraging reforestation;
• reducing methane emissions (in the coal and gas industry, through fertilisers, 
sewage sludge, waste and rice cultivation).
Recommendation	7
The Council recommends that the Netherlands focus its emission reduction 
efforts as a priority on the CDM, with special attention for technology diffu-
sion and transfer. 
No agreement on the final goal, but agreement on the direction
Rather than engaging in arguments about what the correct objective should be, parties 
would do better to reach agreement on what binds them – the direction of climate 
policy – whilst recognising that views on the ultimate objective can differ at present. 
Once more knowledge becomes available on the likely damage and on its temporal and 
geographical localisation, there will be greater clarity concerning the objective to be 
aimed for and the interests of each of the parties in this. There is furthermore agree-
ment on a global distribution of responsibilities and tasks. The UNFCCC lays down a 
‘common but differentiated responsibility’ for rich and poor. As long as the per capita 
emissions in rich countries are a multiple of those in poor countries, it is illusory to 
expect emerging economies to bear the costs of technology diffusion themselves if they 
receive no local benefits in return in the form of a better local environment or greater 
energy efficiency. The additional costs of technology diffusion for climate policy will 
therefore have to be included in the European assessment of climate on objectives and 
the costs to be incurred in achieving them, or even better in the assessments made in 
this regard by all developed countries.
The efficacy paradox 
On its own, the Kyoto Protocol is not effective because of the efficacy paradox: what is 
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achievable is not effective, and what is effective is not achievable. The Kyoto Protocol 
owes its broader acceptance to its limited scope and above all its selectiveness (with 
its focus on countries with an emission reduction obligation). The lesson from Kyoto 
is that a choice has to be made between broad participation with lesser objectives 
or narrow participation with more burdensome objectives. Effective climate policy 
requires a combination of the two, because it depends on the product of participati-
ons and objective. But the Kyoto approach does provide a useful finger exercise for an 
emissions trading system, which at least for CO2 did not exist anywhere before Kyoto, 
supplemented by various mechanisms. This Kyoto approach deserves support. Howe-
ver, it is vital to extend the coalitions supporting this approach and at the same time to 
recognise that all manner of other approaches to climate policy can also contribute at 
global level. In the previous chapter this was described as ‘multicoloured flexibility’.
Recommendation	8
The Council believes that the eu, with an active Netherlands within it, must in 
its own interests promote multilateral coordination, though largely in diffe-
rent ways from those that have been propounded until recently. The EU must 
reflect on the efficacy paradox: what is achievable globally is not effective, 
and what is effective is currently not achievable. For the coming decades the 
direction of the world climate strategy will be a crucial binding element in 
the UNFCCC. A multicoloured flexibility of initiatives is an appropriate part 
of this. Now that the Kyoto approach is working, it is desirable and perhaps 
possible to expand the coalition of Kyoto countries after 2012, though taking 
into account the efficacy paradox, in order to avoid the politics of illusion.
Interests of major players as starting point
The Council believes that global coordination can only succeed if the major players 
form coalitions, which explicitly take into account their interests in the longer term. 
Leaving aside altruistic motives, it is above all the anticipated damage that prompts 
countries to work together. The countries which are expected to suffer the most 
damage will be manoeuvred into a vulnerable position. In short, it is not the polluter 
but the victim of pollution who may find themselves forced to pay or to buy off free 
rider behaviour, at least to some extent. 
In order to form a coalition in the face of these diverging interests, parties will have 
to look for the things that bind them. First and foremost this is the direction of the 
policy: emission reduction. Other elements are the resources and some conditions: 
deploying technological resources cost-effectively, preferably via the market mecha-
nism and with as little impact as possible on economic growth. Finally, crucial for 
climate policy are the interests of securing energy supplies for countries with diverging 
energy structures and economic growth rates. The time horizon for solving problems 
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relating to security of energy supplies is short, which means that these problems are 
given high priority. Both climate policy and energy supply security impinge directly on 
interests in relation to energy policy. Climate policy which takes insufficient account 
of the urgency of energy supply security is doomed to fail. When it comes to energy 
efficiency, the interests of the climate and energy supply security run parallel, making 
energy efficiency a potentially promising core focus of policy. 
Recommendation	9
The Dutch climate strategy must as a priority exploit the synergy of the inte-
rests of security of energy supply and climate policy, because without this link 
climate policy will receive insufficient support and will encounter internatio-
nal resistance. 
The following core elements are important in the Council’s view: (1) achievable results; 
(2) multicoloured flexibility; (3) the UNFCCC as a framework; (4) stimulating leader-
ship; and (5) the formation of coalitions.
(1) Achievable results make a contribution
There is little point in seeking to establish the ‘post-Kyoto architecture’ of the multi-
lateral coordination for a long period at this juncture. Kyoto has shown that time-
lines with policy consequences lead, due to lack of flexibility, to alienation between 
UNFCCC parties. 
(2) Multicoloured flexibility
The	eU	and the Netherlands must be open to initiatives alongside Kyoto, though 
without abandoning the Kyoto approach. This is why the Council proposes a sort of 
‘multicultural flexibility’ which leaves all UNFCCC parties free to engage in other, more 
or less ambitious forms of climate policy. Examples might include a no-regret policy 
(such as improving energy efficiency, something that is also useful even without a 
climate problem and which has enormous potential in developing countries); no-lose 
policy (an incentive to emission reduction, but not a sanction); technology development 
and diffusion; intensity targets; self-imposed climate policies and measures (PAMS) 
with accountability; and the higher ambition of emissions trading systems or a carbon 
price. Just as with the trading policy, it is both possible and attractive to encourage bila-
teral and regional arrangements for certain aspects of emission reduction, for example 
as part of existing special relations or development policy. The notion of multicoloured 
flexibility also implies an alliance not just on vertical measures imposed by govern-
ments, but a much greater involvement of the private sector in climate policy. Energy-
intensive industries and the automotive industry, in particular, have a great deal to 
contribute. Sectoral agreements can then remove concerns about the undermining of 
competitiveness for individual companies, provided free-rider behaviour is avoided. 
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(3) The UNFCCC is a suitable framework
The UNFCCC has proved to offer a suitable basis of principles on which to build multi-
lateral coordination. The UNFCCC acts as a foundation that offers negotiating parties 
opportunities which can be used in a variety of ways over a period of several decades. 
Parties appreciate their participation (which for far and away the majority of parti-
cipants is without obligation) in the Conference of the Parties (CoP) of the UNFCCC 
countries, and they meet specific elements of UNFCCC programmes and the (limited) 
obligations, although interests and perceptions can (still) vary enormously. If a global 
emission reduction strategy is to be effective, however, a modest degree of organisa-
tion and a certain amount of problem-ownership are desirable. 
The huge cop meetings could be made more effective through the establishment of a 
World Climate Organisation (wCo), as a standing organisation backed by permanent 
diplomatic missions. There would need to be a form of executive body – the Special 
Climate Council (SCC) referred to in chapter 5 – with a number of permanent members 
(between five and eight of the largest producers of GHGS) and a number of rotating 
country members operating under a rotating presidency. This construction would insti-
tutionalise the leadership and foster the favourable effects of problem-ownership.
(4) Leadership must stimulate
In the initial phases, the leadership can act as a catalyst. Leadership requires a willing-
ness to invest, encourage and pay. It is the leader who indicates the urgency, who has 
to be credible and who has to set an example. Leadership must however remain func-
tional: it must serve as a catalyst, not as a one-sided subsidy tap, and must not become 
an undermining factor for competitiveness. Leadership is unsuitable, and can even be 
abused, if interests diverge too widely and/or there is a lack of willingness among the 
partners. Less uncertainty in the future will probably lead to a more active stance by 
parties such as the us, but probably also China and India. This activation could form 
the basis of a Special Climate Council (SCC) in a future WCO. However, this will mark 
the end of the self-professed prerogative of leadership by the eu. 
(5) Leadership by coalitions
Leadership could also be exercised by a coalition of major players. The costs of leader-
ship would be more easily borne by such a coalition, because the coalition as a whole 
could get closer to the optimum balance between costs and benefits than an individual 
player. The Council sees a coalition of between five and eight of the biggest ghg produ-
cers as an effective means of achieving the required emission reductions up to 2050. 
The institutionalisation of a scc within a WCO would be an appropriate vehicle for this, 
though by no means the only option.




The power of a small country lies in nagging, niggling and encouraging with fresh 
initiatives. An active international diplomacy which forms a link bridging the wide gap 
between the major parties can contribute to the required multicoloured flexibility of 
international obligations and initiatives. 
The Netherlands occupies a special position in that it is home to a relatively large 
number of major multinationals and a high proportion of non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOS). Major corporations will increasingly be held accountable for their social 
responsibility. Industry can be involved in the multicoloured flexibility referred to 
above, both via its own marketing initiatives, international variants of covenants and 
investments in research, as well as through the development of technical standards for 
products and the production process. For example, the technology platforms subsidi-
sed by the	eU	are better able than the government itself to select promising research 
priorities and secure commitment to them from the relevant parties. 
The Netherlands operates the Top Technology Institute concept (tti), which has 
drawn respect from the	eU	among others. It is a virtual institute that provides a forum 
for public-private partnership in which businesses, government and knowledge insti-
tutes have entered into both an administrative and financial commitment in the ratio 
of 25%, 50% and 25%, respectively. The initiative for research programmes come from 
industry; the government performs marginal tests, though the research must be of 
international top quality. A tti	is a tried and tested means of guaranteeing that a shift 
in emphasis towards fundamental knowledge development in a bid to achieve an emis-
sion-free energy supply does not become stranded in good intentions. In addition, a	
tti could provide an economic impetus for the knowledge economy. 
Recommendation	10
The Council recommends a shift in emphasis away from emission reduction 
within the Netherlands and towards ambitious knowledge development for 
the long term. By establishing a Top Technology Institute focusing on an 
emission-free energy supply, the Netherlands must stimulate fundamental 
research of the highest international standard. In addition, there is scope 
for more systematic cooperation with multinational corporations and Ngos 
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